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WHISTLEBLOWERS AND FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION* 
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER** 
This Article critically examines post–financial crisis 
whistleblower regimes and their impact on contemporary 
financial markets. In particular, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
program, as implemented by the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, has received significant attention in legal, 
political, and popular quarters. Some praise the whistleblower 
program as essential to aiding the government’s efforts in 
overcoming enforcement challenges, while others remain wary of 
the program’s unintended effects. This Article advances the 
debate—in favor of whistleblowers—by offering an updated 
analysis of the program’s benefits and costs, in light of recent 
trends in complexity and innovation that have made financial 
activity much more diffuse. 
By weighing the program’s utility in the postcrisis financial 
landscape, together with its benefits and costs, this Article argues 
that the SEC whistleblower program is, on balance, desirable: 
not only because whistleblower solutions can be effective at 
detecting financial misconduct in complex financial spaces, but 
also because they serve other valuable social and economic goals. 
Overall, the aim of this Article is to prompt further conversation 
about whistleblower programs by critically examining the crux of 
regulators’ need for whistleblowers in the financial services 
arena, revisiting a conceptual cost-benefit analysis of the 
program, and suggesting certain aspects of the SEC program that 
are ripe for revaluation and, potentially, redesign. 
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In 2012, a group of traders at JP Morgan Chase lost (at least) 
$6	billion trading exotic credit derivatives.1 Led by the infamous 
“London Whale”—dubbed so for taking enormous market 
positions—the group for years had been engaged in a high-risk, high-
 
 1. JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 1, 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter Senate Hearing, 
Whale Trades]. “	‘Derivatives’ are contractual instruments that derive their value from the 
values of underlying instruments or commodities upon which they are based.” JOHN C. 
COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (13th ed. 2015).  
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reward strategy, essentially betting on the price of certain bonds.2 
Eventually, when this strategy started to fare poorly, the Whale 
“doubled-down” on his risky position and grew their portfolio to a 
“perilous size.”3 Ultimately that strategy collapsed, “shock[ing] the 
investing public.”4 Investigations later discovered that the London 
Whale’s traders had hidden growing losses from regulatory scrutiny 
by manipulating internal risk-valuation models and keeping a 
separate accounting to downplay their deteriorating position.5 
There has been no shortage of serious financial misconduct in 
global institutions and markets since the global financial crisis of 
2008.6 In the same year as the London Whale’s losses, regulators in 
the United States and abroad discovered that several large, global 
 
 2. Eleazar David Melendez, How Did JP Morgan Lose Billions in One Trade? London 
‘Whale’ Explained, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 11, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-did-
jpmorgan-lose-billions-one-trade-london-whale-explained-698018 [http://perma.cc/7VS6-
4F6A]. 
 3. Senate Hearing, Whale Trades, supra note 1, at 4 (“In the first quarter of 2012, the 
CIO traders went on a sustained trading spree, eventually increasing [their credit 
derivatives portfolio] from $51 billion to $157 billion	.	.	.	[despite the fact that] the portfolio 
was rapidly losing value.”). 
 4. Id. at 1; see EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42545, WHAT IS 
SYSTEMIC RISK? DOES IT APPLY TO RECENT JP MORGAN LOSSES? 8 (2012), https://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42545.pdf [http://perma.cc/23BH-26PU]. JP Morgan’s $6 billion loss 
did not ultimately bring that institution close to insolvency or destabilize the broader 
economy. Yet, given the significance and size of that financial institution, larger losses 
certainly could have disrupted the global credit and liquidity markets. Id. at 8–9 (noting 
that “[t]he Fed’s stress test for JP Morgan [at the time] assumed $56 billion in loan losses 
in addition to assuming $28 billion in losses in transactions”). 
 5. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, Whale Trades, supra note 1, at 3–8; Dan Fitzpatrick, Jean 
Eaglesham & Devin Barrett, Two Charged in J.P. Morgan ‘Whale’ Trades, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
14, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324823804579012550859130222 
[http://perma.cc/9YAU-76M9 (dark archive)]; Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, 
BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the
-london-whale [http://perma.cc/E98Q-HBLE]; Ryan Tracy, New York Fed Faulted in 
‘London Whale’ Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-
fed-failed-to-examine-j-p-morgan-london-whale-unit-1413900070 [http://perma.cc/YN5B-
AGLD (dark archive)]; see also James B. Stewart, Convictions Prove Elusive in ‘London 
Whale’ Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17
/business/figures-in-london-whale-trading-case-escape-the-authorities-nets.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/DL3X-WG3Y] (reporting that the criminal case against the Whale has 
been dropped in the United Kingdom). 
 6. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 
441, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE 
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43 
(2d Sess. 2010) [hereinafter SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY] (explaining how 
complex financial products, left unchecked, fanned the flames of the crisis, owing to 
“[g]aps in the regulatory structure [that] allowed these risks and products to flourish 
outside the view of those responsible for overseeing the financial system”); Christina 
Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1576–88 (2016) (discussing 
misconduct as a market-wide risk). 
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banks had been for years manipulating international interest rate 
benchmarks and—in a separate scandal—the market for foreign 
exchange currency.7 Most recently, in September 2015, twelve major 
global banks settled civil claims that they had been conspiring to fix 
prices in the market for credit default swaps.8 
With finite regulatory resources, detecting financial misconduct 
is a perennial challenge.9 Manpower constraints are, as always, a 
limiting factor. As William Dudley, President and CEO of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York Fed”), recently 
explained: “[s]upervisors simply do not have sufficient ‘boots on the 
ground’ to ferret out all forms of bad behavior within a giant, global, 
financial institution.”10 Regulators also lack real-time information and 
up-to-date expertise necessary to anticipate misconduct on the 
horizon. As financial activity becomes increasingly innovative and 
much more diffuse, these resource deficiencies will inevitably 
continue to grow. 
One partial solution is to enlist help from the private sector.11 In 
that vein, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act 
 
 7. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 5 
(2012); The Libor Investigation, WALL ST. J., http://stream.wsj.com/story/the-libor-
investigation/SS-2-32262 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/6BGF-GKTE]; Chad 
Bray, Jenny Anderson & Ben Protess, Big Banks Are Fined $4.25 Billion in Inquiry into 
Currency-Rigging, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british
-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-scandal [http://perma.cc
/463S-ZK7S]; Six Banks Fined £2.6bn by Regulators over Forex Failings, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30016007 [http://perma.cc/8CZS-G5SF]. 
 8. Jonathan Stempel, Big Banks Just Paid $1.9 Billion to Settle Claims They 
Manipulated Another Market, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.businessinsider
.com/big-banks-in-19-billion-swaps-price-fixing-settlement-2015-9 [http://perma.cc/ZW4J-
P3GT]. 
 9. See, e.g., Tracy, supra note 5. The SEC, however, is “actively recruiting more 
brainpower to tackle complex product markets.” Matt Scully, SEC: Banks May Be Shifting 
Asset Risk for Better Capital Treatment, AM. BANKER (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www
.americanbanker.com/issues/179_204/sec-banks-may-be-shifting-asset-risk-for-better-
capital-treatment-1070747-1.html [http://perma.cc/P3DR-FL2H (dark archive)]. According 
to those with industry knowledge, those partnerships are believed to be a “game-changer.” 
Id. A 2010 study by economist Alexander Dyck and co-authors found that of 216 major 
incidents of financial misconduct between 1996 and 2004, the SEC detected only seven 
percent of them. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle 
on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213–14 (2010). 
 10. William C. Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the 
Financial Services Industry, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.newyorkfed
.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [http://perma.cc/WPE2-FUPR]. 
 11. Michael Walsh, an assistant Vice President in the New York Fed’s legal and 
compliance group, put the point plainly: “[i]f people are expecting my group of 40 to 
understand every single risk without the help of the [financial] institutions, that’s an 
impossible task.” Justin Baer, Top Wall Street Lawyer Slams Regulatory Environment, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
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of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) adopted a whistleblower program, to be 
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“Commission”).12 Whistleblowers in this scheme are rewarded with 
cash bounties for providing original information to the SEC that leads 
to a successful enforcement action. In establishing this program, 
Congress believed that private market insiders could aid the SEC in 
overcoming its resource limitations, on the rationale that individuals 
working within these financial institutions and markets are well 
equipped to detect malfeasance.13 
Yet despite its surface appeal, reactions to the SEC 
whistleblower program have been mixed. On the one hand, regulators 
are optimistic about the program. SEC Chair Mary Jo White has 
praised it as “enormously successful.”14 With similar enthusiasm, 
former Attorney General Eric Holder spoke publicly in favor of 
expanding an SEC-type whistleblower program to the criminal 
arena.15 The private sector, however, is more reserved. Some industry 
stakeholders are concerned that, among other things, the program has 
and will interfere with internal corporate compliance initiatives.16 
Others suggest that cash incentives are morally corrupting, or, at the 
least, promote frivolous (even vengeful) reporting. And so today, four 
years into the program’s existence, the question of whether the 
 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/top-wall-street-lawyer-slams-
regulatory-environment-1426718956 [http://perma.cc/V9G4-G9RP].  
 12. The SEC promulgated its whistleblower program under section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6, which was added by section 922 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-
Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, §	21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §	78u-6 (2012)). 
 13. See SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 110–11. 
 14. Barbara Shecter, SEC Chair Mary Jo White Praises ‘Enormously Successful’ 
Whistleblower Program, FIN. POST (Oct. 16, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/news
/fp-street/sec-chair-mary-jo-white-praises-enormously-successful-whistleblower-program 
[http://perma.cc/P3M8-MNCC]. 
 15. Devlin Barrett, Holder Proposes Bigger Rewards for Wall Street Whistleblowers, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/attorney-general-holder-to-
propose-big-new-rewards-for-wall-street-whistleblowers-1410957241?alg=y [http://perma
.cc/FWQ4-ZCQW (dark archive)]. 
 16. See John T. Zach & Randall W. Jackson, The Challenge of Misplaced 
Whistleblower Incentives, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id
=1202738010670/The-Challenge-of-Misplaced-Whistleblower-Incentives?slreturn
=20160009130751 [http://perma.cc/VT8Y-QBQ5] (“If reported to the company, key factual 
allegations can be quickly verified (or discredited), relevant individuals can be interviewed 
and key documentary evidence can be reviewed. The SEC’s enforcement staff, by practice 
necessarily influenced by past experience, cannot assess allegations with such precision or 
efficiency.”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
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program serves the public interest—and if so, at an appropriate cost—
remains open. 
This Article seeks to advance the ongoing debate about 
whistleblower programs in two ways. First, it revisits some of the costs 
and benefits postulated at the beginning of the SEC program, with an 
analysis that is updated in light of the financial landscape today.17 
Second, this Article adds a transnational regulatory dimension to the 
analysis in order to more completely inform the domestic debate. To 
those ends, the Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reorients the 
debate about whistleblowers by illustrating why, in this postcrisis era 
of innovative finance, regulators need to draw on private insiders to 
adequately enforce the securities laws. Three case studies in financial 
innovation are used to demonstrate circumstances in which 
whistleblowers are helpful—and sometimes indispensable—adjuncts 
to state power. Based on these cases, Part I argues that, as a baseline, 
whistleblower programs are worthy additions to the financial 
regulators’ toolkit. 
From that baseline, Part II engages in a conceptual cost-benefit 
analysis of whistleblower programs. It considers a few of the more 
salient costs of whistleblower programs: the inefficiencies they impose 
on the private market and (potentially) their ability to fuel antisocial 
relationships. Part II also considers the realized and potential benefits 
of whistleblower programs, such as the increased detection of 
misconduct, enhanced efficiency in the use of finite government 
resources, heightened legitimacy of the financial services sector, 
increased opportunity for market discipline, and improvement in 
industry culture. Upon weighing the costs against the benefits, Part II 
 
 17. Compare Sundar Narayanan, Are Whistleblower Reward Programs Really a Good 
Idea?, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/11/30
/are-whistleblower-reward-programs-really-a-good-idea.html [http://perma.cc/5EVM-FY45], 
with Gordon Schnell, Gordon Schnell: Yes, We Need Whistleblower Rewards, FCPA BLOG 
(Dec. 3, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/12/3/gordon-schnell-yes-we-
need-whistleblower-rewards.html [http://perma.cc/756Q-UJ8D]. For existing postcrisis 
literature on financial whistleblower laws, see, for example, Dave Ebersole, Comment, 
Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 125–27 (2011); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by 
the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 76–104 (2012); Amanda M. Rose, Better 
Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud 
Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1260–85 (2014). For a general discussion of 
qui tam lawsuits brought under the False Claims Act, see David Freeman Engstrom, 
Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1244 (2012). For an excellent discussion of complexity and innovation in financial 
markets more generally, see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of 
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 238–42 (2012). 
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suggests that a strong and well-incentivized whistleblower program, 
along the Dodd-Frank model, can advance social welfare and 
economic efficiency. 
Part III then discusses the implications of Parts I and II. 
Specifically, it points to several potential design flaws or weaknesses 
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program and suggests possible, 
albeit preliminary, modifications to the program for regulators to 
consider. 
I.  WHISTLEBLOWERS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD 
Finance today is increasingly innovative and diffuse, which 
characteristics pose particular challenges for securities law 
enforcement.18 Where regulators lack expertise in a new and often 
complex financial area, misconduct can be more difficult to anticipate. 
Meanwhile, as financial activity spreads well beyond traditional 
financial institutions, monitoring these disperse spaces will also 
stretch regulators’ resources thin. 
This Part draws attention to two fast-growing areas of the 
financial services sector—securitization and structured finance 
(particularly in the shadow banking system) and financial 
technology—to illustrate why securities regulators, on their own, have 
difficulty detecting misconduct as it arises today. Through these 
various examples, Section I.A shows possible gaps in regulators’ 
capacity to anticipate and detect misconduct. Section I.B then turns to 
the specific details of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program and 
explains the program’s potential to aid the SEC in narrowing these 
gaps. 
A. Regulatory Gaps: A Case Study 
This Section provides a brief case study in innovation and 
diffusion. The aim of this study is to highlight—and in some cases, 
foreshadow—regulatory challenges to come, as an increasing 
proportion of financial activity takes place beyond regulators’ 
expertise and, in some cases, supervisory purview. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
293, 298–311 (2012); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial 
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 657–63 (2012). 
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1.  Shadow Banking19 
Traditionally, banks provide credit to consumers and companies 
in a relatively straightforward way: banks take short-term deposits 
and from those deposits make longer-term loans.20 Today, however, a 
substantial amount of this activity—called financial intermediation—
takes place through securitization.21 As one commentator at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted, “[i]n modern banking, 
origination of loans is done mostly with a view to convert the loan 
into securities—a practice called securitization, whereby the 
transaction, processing and servicing fees are the intermediaries’ 
principal source of revenue.”22 
Unlike the basic two-step process of deposit-taking and loan-
making, securitization takes place in a sequence of complex steps 
and—potentially—by a number of institutions: (1) a loan (e.g., a 
student loan, mortgage, or auto loan) is originated by a regulated 
commercial bank or an unregulated finance company; (2) the loan is 
then sold to a “warehouse bank”—called an “aggregator, seller or 
sponsor” (which can be the same as the originator); (3) the 
“administrator” creates a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) that issues 
securities against these loans; (4) the underwriter (typically an 
investment bank) sells the securities to investors, who get payments 
from the securities in their order of priority.23 As this assembly-line 
process suggests, securitization can be a diffuse activity. Much of it 
takes place outside of the traditionally regulated banking sector—or 
at least not under a single bank’s roof—in the so-called shadow 
banking system.24  
 
 19. See Judge, supra note 18, at 659 (coining the term “fragmentation nodes” to refer 
to securitization and related complex financial products). 
 20. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Staff Report No. 458, 2010) (2013). 
 21. In particular, credit intermediation involves (1) credit transformation, “the 
enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by the intermediary through the use of 
priority of claims”; (2) maturity transformation, “the use of short term deposits to fund 
long-term loans”; and (3) liquidity transformation, “the use of liquid assets” (i.e., deposits) 
“to fund illiquid assets” (i.e., mortgages). Id. at 3–4. 
 22. Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, 
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2011, at 8, 10–11. 
 23. Id. at 11. In some cases, most of these steps can happen under the aegis of a large 
investment bank. 
 24. See Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 22, at 9 (“[W]hat was once accomplished under 
a single roof in the traditional banking system is now done over a sequence of steps in the 
shadow banking system, each performed by specialized entities that are not vertically 
integrated.”). The term “shadow banking” was first used by Paul McCulley of the PIMCO 
investment fund. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, SHADOW 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
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In general, shadow banking intermediates credit “through a wide 
range of securitization and secured funding techniques, including 
asset-backed commercial paper (CP), asset-backed securities (ABS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and repurchase agreements 
(repos).”25 Included in the broad definition are the range of “financial 
intermediaries” that engage in these various credit intermediation 
functions, but unlike the traditional banking sector, may lack access 
to the Federal Reserve discount window and other public 
guarantees.26 They include, among others, “finance 
companies,	.	.	.	credit hedge funds, [and] money market mutual 
funds.”27 And unlike the traditional banking sector, the shadow 
banking system is expanding at a rapid pace. According to the 
Financial Stability Board’s (“FSB”) 2013 report, the global shadow 
banking sector accounted for $71.2 trillion of assets at the end of 
2012, equivalent to fifty-two percent of regulated banking assets in 
the report’s sample of twenty global jurisdictions plus the Eurozone 
overall.28 
 
BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9, n.8 (2010), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn
_media/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2US-E8Y9]. 
 25. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 1. Returning to the securitization sequence set 
out above, Pozsar and co-authors explain the role of various shadow banking entities in a 
securitization process: (1) loan origination by “finance companies”; (2) loan warehousing 
by “single- and multi-seller conduits”; (3) pooling/structuring of the loans into securities 
by broker-dealers at ABS syndicate desks; (4) ABS warehousing funded through repos; 
(5) pooling/structuring of ABS into CDOs by broker-dealers’ ABS desks; (6) ABS 
intermediation by “limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs), securities arbitrage conduits, and credit hedge funds”; (7) funding of all of these 
activities through wholesale funding markets. Id. at 7. 
 26. Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 22, at 8. 
 27. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 
621 (2012). Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke defined shadow 
banking as “compris[ing] a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out 
traditional banking functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the 
traditional system of regulated depository institutions.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response 
3 (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2RYG-V582]. With respect to money market funds, these institutions 
have become more heavily regulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 
1940. See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,132, 75 
Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010). 
 28. FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2013, at 
8, 12 (2013); see FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 
2015, at 7–11 (2015). While the United States and United Kingdom have the largest 
shadow banking systems, shadow banking has also grown significantly in other emerging 
economies. IMF, RISK TAKING, LIQUIDITY, AND SHADOW BANKING, Global Financial 
Stability Report, at 66 (Oct. 2014). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
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The rapid growth of the securitization market is a double-edged 
sword. While beneficial in terms of risk spreading, the process—
particularly when concentrated in the shadow banking system—can 
make regulatory monitoring for misconduct quite difficult. For one, 
securitization can give rise to a type of moral hazard. As Pozsar and 
co-authors have written, securitization-based credit intermediation 
“creates agency problems that do not exist when these activities are 
conducted within a bank.”29 For example, with only a slice of the 
product to manage—and then move along—no one actor (individual 
or institutional) is sufficiently vested in the integrity of the whole. As 
discussed below, “[i]f these agency problems are not adequately 
mitigated, the financial system is prone to excessive lowering of 
underwriting standards and to overly aggressive structuring of 
securities.”30 
The financial crisis is a prime example. In the years preceding the 
financial crisis, the market for mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) 
boomed.31 The underlying asset in these MBS, in many cases, 
consisted of subprime mortgage loans that had been originated with 
poor underwriting standards and diligence by the institutions that 
purchased them. To make matters worse, a market in derivative 
products was created, including collateralized debt obligations 
(“CDO”)—bundles of MBS collateralized by the promise to repay 
the underlying subprime loans32—and credit default swaps (“swaps” 
or “CDS”)—used as “insurance for subprime [mortgage] exposure.”33 
 
 29. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 3; see also David C. Wheelock & Paul W. 
Wilson, Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency, 77 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 689, 690 (1995) (discussing the results from a study on bank failures in 
Kansas during the 1920s resulting from widespread farm mortgage defaults). 
 30. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 3. 
 31. MBS are structured financial products in which mortgages are bundled into 
tranches. Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC (July 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers
/mortgagesecurities.htm [http://perma.cc/W9Z9-8AHR]. Banks sell these tranches as a type 
of security. Id. Securitization, classically or legitimately, is used to spread risk. But prior to 
the crisis, securitization was used in an inventive way in order “not to share risk with 
investors, but to make an end run around capital-adequacy regulations.” See Viral V. 
Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 
196–97 (2009). 
 32. See Definition of Collateralised Debt Obligation CDO, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft
.com/Term?term=Collateralised-debt-obligation-CDO [http://perma.cc/GUV8-MWHV]. 
 33. René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 
77 (2010); see SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 29–30, 43. In the 
Senate Committee Report, Congress pointed out that the decision not to regulate 
derivatives, especially credit default swaps, exacerbated the crisis. Id. at 29–30, 43. That 
report referenced statements made by the Obama Administration that “the downside of 
this lax regulatory regime	.	.	.	became disastrously clear during the recent financial crisis” 
where investors had large positions in these unregulated products that ultimately “saddled 
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Ultimately, investors were harmed. In some cases, banks 
misrepresented the nature of the underlying subprime mortgage 
loans.34 In others, banks may have failed to disclose the magnitude of 
their exposure to the volatile mortgage market.35 Gaps in regulatory 
expertise and monitoring may have been partly to blame.36 As 
Congress noted, “[t]he system [had] operated on a wholesale 
misunderstanding of, or complete disregard for the risks inherent in 
the underlying assets and the complex instruments they were 
backing.”37 Notably, these examples of misconduct in connection with 
securitized products reflect only that which was eventually uncovered 
in the large, well-regulated financial institutions. Misconduct at 
various other intermediaries in the securitization pipeline is invariably 
much more difficult to anticipate and detect.38 As Tomasz Piskorski 
and co-authors point out,  
[m]arket rules and regulations	.	.	.	require disclosure of 
information and prohibit misleading statements on the financial 
products being manufactured by intermediaries	.	.	.	[but] the 
nature of intermediation has changed dramatically over the past 
decade, with the introduction of more agents in the supply 
chain of credit	.	.	.	potentially weakening the ability of existing 
 
our financial system with an enormous—and largely unrecognized—level of risk.” Id. at 
29–30 (emphasis added) (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 47 (2009)). 
 34. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 441, 453 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a 
single, simple question. Did defendants accurately describe the home mortgages in the 
Offering Documents for the securities they sold that were backed by those mortgages? 
Following trial, the answer to that question is clear. The Offering Documents did not 
correctly describe the mortgage loans.”). 
 35. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1448, 1450 
(2014) (noting that although CDOs were erroneously marketed as safe products, it is 
difficult to tell whether these assets failed because of “improper engineering” or “the 
general downturn in the economy”). Also, in 2013, finance economists Tomasz Piskorski, 
Amit Seru, and James Witkin collected and analyzed data on mortgage asset fraud in 
connection with the financial crisis. Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & James Witkin, Asset 
Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market, 
70 J. FIN. 2635, 2635–36 (2015). They found “a significant propensity of reputable banks to 
sell misrepresented loans during the housing market boom” and that “[t]his behavior also 
appears to have largely escaped regulators in charge of safeguarding the rights of 
investors.” Id. at 2674–75. 
 36. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 567–68 
(2009) (noting that banks “stockpile[d]” these assets despite a lack of understanding 
within the industry, regulators included). 
 37. SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 43. 
 38. See Judge, supra note 18, at 684–90. 
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market arrangements and regulatory oversight to ensure 
truthful disclosure of asset quality.39 
In short, as innovation in securitization advances and expands, 
regulators’ capacity to detect misconduct in the securitization 
business will continue to be stretched.  
 Consider just one hypothetical looming large on the horizon. 
Recently, the market for auto-loan ABS has grown considerably. The 
sector originated $97.8 billion of loans in 2015,40 bringing the total 
outstanding to somewhere around $170 billion.41 Strikingly, issuance 
volume represents a twenty-five percent increase from 2014, while 
credit card debt and other consumer finance products have remained 
flat.42 These signs suggest that a bubble may be brewing, fueled by 
“competition among lenders keen on getting in on lucrative 
securitizations,” and creating the same sorts of opportunities for 
misconduct that arose prior to the recent financial crisis.43 In the auto-
ABS market, just like most other securitized product markets, lengthy 
and prolix disclosure documents detail a number of complex 
processes in connection with originating and bundling loans, which 
responsibilities are spread across multiple actors along a financial 
product assembly line.44 To the extent this securitization activity is, 
again, occurring outside of the large, well-regulated banks, regulatory 
resources to monitor for misconduct will likely be spread thin.45 
 
 39. Piskorski et al., supra note 35, at 2635. 
 40. U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA (2016), http://www.sifma.org
/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-US-ABS-SIFMA.xls?n=84917 [http://
perma.cc/8KQM-5BJV (staff-uploaded archive)]; see Tyler Durden, Don’t Look Now, but 
the Subprime Auto Bubble May Be Bursting, ZERO HEDGE (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-13/dont-look-now-subprime-auto-bubble-may-be
-bursting [http://perma.cc/4UCC-EQFQ]. 
 41. SIFMA, supra note 40. According to an industry source, the total ABS market is 
$1.387 trillion—$705 billion excluding CDOs and housing-related ABSs. Id. 
 42. Durden, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Judge, supra note 18, at 659–60. 
 45. Awrey, supra note 17, at 284 & n.272 (noting that “the Dodd-Frank Act also seeks 
to enhance the regulation of ABS and other securitizations—including, importantly, those 
offered under exemptions from the prospectus and registration requirements under the 
Securities Act” (emphasis omitted)); Durden, supra note 40; see also Dodd-Frank Act, 
§	941(a), §	77, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §	78c(a)(77) 2012)) 
(defining an “asset-backed security”); id. §	941(b) (defining “securitizer”); id. sec. 942(b), 
§	7(c) (increasing disclosure requirements surrounding underlying assets in ABS); Asset-
Backed Securities, SEC (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank
/assetbackedsecurities.shtml [http://perma.cc/6WFQ-ALNC]. The Commission passed 
rules in August 2014, known as Regulation AB II, that require issuers of asset-backed 
securities (backed by auto loans among others) to disclose detailed information about the 
loans underlying the securities. See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 
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From this vantage point, it is not surprising that regulators are 
concerned about the shadow banking system and debating whether 
more regulation is needed.46 So far, however, much of that 
conversation has focused on regulators’ ability simply to understand 
(and possibly curb) the activities of the bespoke institutions, many of 
which operate without the same kinds of supervision or regulations 
that are imposed on traditional banks (like capital adequacy 
requirements).47 As the crisis well illustrated, a regulatory handle over 
the entire securitization process—including each of these shadow 
bank intermediaries—is of key importance to the stability of the 
financial system.48 But the sheer size and scope of the shadow banking 
system makes a detailed understanding of that sector—let alone a 
robust capacity to detect abuses within it—difficult for regulators to 
accomplish alone.49 
2.  Technology 
The proliferation of financial technology in the past several years 
also presents challenges for securities regulation and enforcement. 
Two technological developments in particular—fintech and 
crowdfunding—demonstrate the ramping up of financial technology 
 
Securities Act Release No. 9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72,982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 
57,184 (Sept. 24, 2014). 
 46. Michael Flaherty & Howard Schneider, U.S. Regulators Struggle in Effort to Tackle 
Shadow Banking, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04
/01/usa-fed-shadowbanks-idUSL3N0WY4O420150401#UHvyzRgyAYo1RG8c.97/ 
[http://perma.cc/9BB4-8HL8]; see also Ryan Tracy, SEC Official: ‘Not Clear’ Bank 
Regulation Has Made Economy Safer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 8:29 PM), http://blogs
.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/01/sec-official-not-clear-bank-regulation-has-made-economy-
safer [http://perma.cc/7FMP-97VJ (dark archive)] (reporting that Fed Vice Chairman 
Stanley Fischer “floated several ideas for regulating shadow banks, some of which might 
take SEC action to implement”). 
 47. See Huw Jones, Regulators Lack Data to Probe Shadow Banking Sector, REUTERS 
(May 2, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-regulations-shadowbanks-
idUSBREA410EM20140502#7jKlLJriOZJTzoQq.97 [http://perma.cc/NQ9E-CVP2]. 
 48. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES 
WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR 
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 9 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087
.pdf [http://perma.cc/T72S-R4SM] (explaining that “activities being called shadow banking 
are often still subject to securities regulation,” but “[t]he reach of financial regulators to 
address policy problems in shadow banking varies from activity to activity and from class 
of firm to class of firm”). 
 49. Id.; cf. Matthew Goldstein, Whistle-Blower on Countrywide Mortgage Misdeeds to Get 
$57 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/countrywide-
whistle-blower-to-receive-more-than-57-million/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/2AWH-3SB6] 
(discussing the importance of whistleblowing and insider information in federal 
prosecutors’ claims against Bank of America). 
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and innovation in a postcrisis world and the gaps in regulation and 
supervision that exist. 
Financial technology includes a relatively new “fintech” sector, 
that is a recent wave of startups focused on technological innovation 
in finance, many of which are based in New York City. The products 
that fintech startups are creating run the gamut from financial 
services (like platforms providing for location-based commerce and 
peer-to-peer social payments) to cybersecurity (including platforms 
designed to combat new threats, such as cyberhacking).50 
The fintech sector has become a global attraction. In fact, global 
financing activity in U.S. fintech firms attracted almost $1 billion in 
capital and a record 109 closed deals in the first quarter of 2014.51 
Additional figures show that global investment in fintech grew four 
times faster than overall investments from venture capital firms in the 
past three years.52 From 2010 to 2014, investment in U.S. fintech rose 
from $1.64 billion to $9.89 billion.53 As one industry report stated, 
“The financial services industry is more focused on technology 
innovation than at any other point in its history	.	.	.	.”54 
While many financial technology firms and products no doubt 
expand consumer choice and lower the price of financial services—
classic economic “goods”—the sweep of financial technology presents 
new challenges from a regulatory perspective. For one, it may be 
difficult for regulators to keep pace with developments in how risk is 
transferred, shared, or created, as large institutions develop or 
partner with new technology ventures.55 For example, some large 
financial firms have developed creative “third-party initiatives” with 
smaller fintech firms, or have themselves spun-off their own 
innovation labs that may technically be exempt from the established 
rules.56 Thus some growth of the financial technology sector may 
increase financial diffusion and industry evolution in a way that 
strains regulatory supervision and assessment.  
 
 50. ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., THE RISE OF FINTECH 4 (2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Penny Crosman, Meteoric Rise of Startups Evident at Fintech Demo Day, AM. 
BANKER (June 26, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/meteoric-
rise-of-startups-evident-at-fintech-demo-day-1075121-1.html [http://perma.cc/AEH9-6L79]. 
 54. ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., supra note 50, at 4. 
 55. Id. at 5; Crosman, supra note 53. 
 56. ACCENTURE & P’SHIP FUND FOR N.Y.C., supra note 50, at 5. But see Jonathan 
Rogers & Peter Wilson, Old Laws, New Models: UK Regulation of FinTech, 
TAYLORWESSING (Oct. 2014), http://www.taylorwessing.com/download/article_uk_reg
_fintech.html [http://perma.cc/3SH3-G96J] (describing the emerging regulatory framework 
for fintech in the United Kingdom). 
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More generally, technology in finance may also give rise to 
opportunity for consumer abuse, particularly in connection with the 
sale of private technology stocks—that is, before those companies go 
public. The SEC is watching this area closely for irregularity, 
specifically with respect to whether the transactions involve securities 
swaps and are violating registration requirements.57 These regulators’ 
concern is that, as a means of avoiding securities law restrictions on 
stock sales, certain “middlemen are designing derivatives that deliver 
payments	.	.	.	based on [the] stock’s perceived value.”58 But since 
many of these private tech companies do not widely and publicly 
disclose their financial information, the “[p]rices used in these private 
sales can be based on little more than a guess.”59 As these financial 
commentators put it, “financial middlemen	.	.	.	are creating a murky, 
ad hoc market where the red-hot stocks of closely held technology 
companies trade largely out of sight of regulators, other investors and 
the companies themselves.”60 
Crowdfunding is another aspect of the ongoing revolution in 
financial technology. Crowdfunding involves “raising many small 
amounts of money from a large number of people”61 for small or 
startup businesses.62 The crowdfunding model of capital raising relies 
on Internet platforms (crowdfunding sites) to raise money from the 
general public, again, accumulating small contributions from many 
 
 57. See, e.g., SEC Files Subpoena Enforcement Action Against Netcirq, LLC for Failure 
to Produce Documents, Litigation Release No. 23,418, 2015 WL 7873435 (Dec. 3, 2015); 
Susan Pulliam & Telis Demos, SEC Steps Up Probe of Pre-IPO Share Trading, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-steps-up-probe-of-pre-ipo-share-trading-
1449020518 [http://perma.cc/X89F-VR5M (dark archive)]; see also Susan Pulliam & Telis 
Demos, How Wall Street Middlemen Help Silicon Valley Employees Cash In Early, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:41	PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wall-street-middlemen-help-
silicon-valley-employees-cash-in-early-1427474284 [http://perma.cc/4L4Z-M7AG (staff-
uploaded archive)] [hereinafter Pulliam & Demos, Middlemen]; Susan Pulliam & Telis 
Demos, Regulators Probe Marketing of Hot Private Tech Shares, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-probe-marketing-of-hot-private-tech-shares-
1436139252 [http://perma.cc/EE4Z-D8KQ (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 58. Pulliam & Demos, Middlemen, supra note 57.  
 59. Id. The prospect of fraud is certainly not only hypothetical. Already, there are 
three cases of alleged misleading of investors and failure to disclose fees before Facebook 
went public. Id. In March of 2015, prosecutors charged a Buffalo man with criminal fraud 
for persuading an investor to give $5 million to a venture capital fund that said it would 
buy Uber shares, but used the money to pay other investors. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES 
(Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-
crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy [http://perma.cc/A3ZQ-LMTG (staff-
uploaded archive)]. 
 62. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Law, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1, 5 (2012). 
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investors.63 For small businesses, crowdfunding provides access to a 
pool of capital that would otherwise be difficult to obtain;64 for 
investors, it makes participation in financial markets—in various 
forms—more accessible.65 
Like fintech, crowdfunding has also become a global 
phenomenon. Crowdfunding websites have popped up all over the 
world, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Europe, 
and Kenya.66 In a similar vein, crowdfunding is becoming increasingly 
globalized—at least one British crowdfunding site has opened its 
investment opportunities across Europe (the first to offer cross-
border investment).67 More recently, a Canadian equity crowdfunding 
site also offered a cross-border equity opportunity for the first time in 
that country.68 Crowdfunding comes in various forms, perhaps most 
commonly providing “rewards” (e.g., a product) or securities.69 
Where “investment crowdfunding” is concerned—equity stock is 
offered—such fundraising efforts fall under the scope of the U.S. 
securities laws.70 However, in 2012, in an effort to stimulate the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. The costs of an initial public offering (“IPO”) and “being public” are substantial. See 
PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE 
YOU 12–13 (2012), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6RXZ-QRZS] (“The process of undertaking an initial public offering is 
rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive. Many companies, having spent months 
exhausting their human and financial resources, view the completion of an IPO as the 
finish line. In reality, this is just the beginning of their new life as a public company[, which 
includes ongoing reporting and disclosure requirements.]”). 
 65. See Bradford, supra note 62, at 5. 
 66. Wil Schroter, Crowdfunding Around the World, FORBES (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wilschroter/2014/07/09/crowdfunding-around-the-world 
[http://perma.cc/CV7W-MYUA (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 67. Kylie Maclellan, British Crowdfunding Site to Allow Cross-Border Investment, 
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/us-crowdfunding-
expansion-idUSBRE9AO0A620131125 [http://perma.cc/R86D-Q2Q9]. 
 68. Oscar Jofre, North America’s First Simultaneous Cross Border Equity Crowdfunding 
Raise: Wafu, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014
/10/51067-north-americas-first-simultaneous-cross-border-equity-crowdfunding-raise-wafu 
[http://perma.cc/M7UG-DKNE]. 
 69. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1457, 1459–60 (2013). 
 70. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to 
Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 427–28 (2013). The securities 
laws apply only to offers, sales, and purchases of securities. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §	77e (2012) 
(prohibiting offers and sales of securities without proper registration); 17 C.F.R. §	240.10b-
5 (2015) (prohibiting fraud and material misstatements and omissions in connection with a 
purchase or sale of securities). Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act includes stock, notes, and 
investment contracts within the definition of security. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 
§	2(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	77b(a)(1) (2012)) (“The term 
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, 
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economy and encourage small business, Congress exempted 
crowdfunding from certain securities law requirements with the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).71 In particular, 
Title III of the JOBS Act created a securities offering exemption for 
“crowdfunding,” which relaxed some of the securities laws’ disclosure 
and registration requirements.72 As Tom Hazen points out, “[w]ithout 
[this] crowdfunding exemption	.	.	.	crowdfunding would not be a 
viable capital-raising method in light of the costs of complying with 
securities registration or even the more limited disclosure 
requirements available under the exemption set forth in SEC 
Regulation A.”73 
Congress required the Commission to make rules to implement 
these new exemptions. Accordingly, in March 2015, the SEC adopted 
a final rule, effective on or about June 19, 2015, that amended the 
existing Regulation A.74 Now, pursuant to Regulation A+, small 
companies can offer and sell up to $50 million (an increase from the 
previous $5 million limit) in equity securities without the need to 
comply with traditional registration and reporting requirements.75 As 
attorneys at the law firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius succinctly 
describe it: 
Regulation A+ offerings are unregistered public offerings in 
which issuers may conduct general solicitation, including 
 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, [or] voting-trust certificate	.	.	.	.”). 
 71. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–305, 
126 Stat. 306, 315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 72. Id. sec. 302, §	4; see also Schwartz, supra note 69, at 1460–64 (discussing the relaxations 
and exemptions); Anna Pinedo, It’s Not Crowdfunding!, MOFO JUMPSTARTER (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.mofojumpstarter.com/2015/07/13/its-not-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/W8ZQ-
BRVU]. 
 73. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on 
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2012). 
 74. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities 
Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, 
80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015). Regulation A is a long-standing exemption allowing 
small companies to sell publicly traded equity securities through a truncated registration 
and review process and exempting these companies from ongoing reporting requirements. 
Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,443 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified as 
amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.); Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 9768, 
9770 (proposed Mar. 20, 1992) (codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.). 
 75. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities 
Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806; see SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller 
Companies’ Access to Capital, SEC (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease
/2015-49.html [http://perma.cc/5ZHL-S66V]. 
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solicitation of non-accredited investors, and the securities 
purchased by investors in a Regulation A+ offering are not 
“restricted securities” under Rule 144. In addition, the 
Regulation A+ offering process is simpler and less costly than a 
registered public offering such as an IPO.76 
Additionally, in October 2015, the SEC finalized rules to allow 
individuals, not just accredited investors, to invest in crowdfunded 
securities.77 The practical import of these exemptions is to expand 
consumer participation in crowdfunding by giving companies a new—
and more streamlined—route to capital raising in the public market 
and by facilitating the trading of their securities in the secondary 
markets.78 
While seemingly advantageous from a market efficiency and 
liquidity perspective, some have expressed concern about these 
exemptions from a consumer protection perspective, suggesting that 
they have created opportunities for fraud.79 While it is certainly too 
soon to tell, some anecdotal evidence so far suggests that these 
concerns are well founded. In June 2015, for example, the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed the first-ever crowdfunding case, 
charging an Oregon man with “unfair or deceptive acts” in raising 
$122,000 in a Kickstarter campaign (a popular crowdfunding site).80 
He allegedly misled investors to believe that he was funding a board 
game project, but instead he used the capital for personal items.81 
Reporting on the events and outcome of this case, Kevin Wack of the 
 




 77. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, Exchange Act Release No. 76,324, 
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015); SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding, SEC (Oct. 
30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [http://perma.cc/SAE4-XEK4]. 
 78. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, supra note 76, at 2; see also Schwartz, supra note 
69, at 1459 (noting that the “crowdfunding of securities will help democratize the market 
for financing startup companies and small businesses and allow investors of modest means 
to make investments that had previously been offered solely to wealthy	.	.	.	investors”). 
 79. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 69, at 1465 & n.46. But see Joan MacLeod 
Hemmingway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 937 (2011) (arguing that notwithstanding 
risks of investor fraud, on balance, the positive benefits of a registration exemption 
outweigh the possible negative consequences). 
 80. Complaint at 1–3, FTC v. Chevalier, No. 3:15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. June 10, 2015); 
Angus Loten, Man Settles with FTC over Crowdfunding Case, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/11/man-settles-with-ftc-over-crowdfunding-case/ 
[http://perma.cc/WS4Y-CMHM (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 81. See sources cited supra note 80. 
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American Banker wrote: “[c]rowdfunding enables fledgling businesses 
to tap into a vast online pool of investment dollars, but it also has a 
dark side, offering a lucrative new venue for scam artists.”82 
This case suggests what others have for several years suspected 
to be true: the diffusion of participation in equity offering and 
investing, enabled by crowdfunding technology, creates a fertile 
ground for abuse. At the same time, as regulators reduce the amount 
of disclosure and reporting required in an effort to encourage small 
business growth, they further limit their ability to monitor for and 
anticipate such misconduct. 
B. Whistleblower Programs 
The foregoing case study in contemporary financial innovation 
illustrated the various constraints on financial regulators’ ability to 
supervise the financial services sector comprehensively and, thus, 
exposed limits on their capacity to detect putative securities law 
violations. In the case of structured finance, the sheer number of 
economic actors involved—from the origination and pooling of loans, 
to their packaging and the offering of securities comprised of these 
fixed-income assets to investors—can muddle information that 
regulators receive. More broadly speaking, the shadow banking 
system in which this process operates raises significant questions 
about the capacity and scope of regulators’ power. Financial 
technology, which is also expansive (and sometimes niche), can 
likewise strain regulators’ ability to monitor the array of institutions 
and markets involved, which evolve quickly and often on a small but 
numerous scale. 
This Section explores one postcrisis regulatory tool that was 
intended to enhance securities law enforcement by leveraging 
assistance from private citizens: whistleblower programs.83 It suggests 
 
 82. Kevin Wack, P-to-P Regulatory Risks Exposed in Crowdfunding-Fraud Case, AM. 
BANKER (June 11, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/marketplace-lending/p-to-ps-
regulatory-risks-exposed-in-crowdfunding-fraud-case-1074835-1.html [http://perma.cc/PF77-
VUHL (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 83. The legislative history suggests that Congress intended for the whistleblower 
provisions to “motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward and assist the 
Government to identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and 
recover money for victims of financial fraud.” SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra 
note 6, at 110. In hearings before the House Committee on Financial Services on July 17, 
2009, Rep. Paul Kanjorski, Democrat from Pennsylvania, stated: “[W]e ought to put more 
cops on the beat by allowing the Commission to pay bounties to whistleblowers whose tips 
result in catching fraudsters.” Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s 
Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
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that, in light of the regulatory gaps explored above, whistleblowers 
have the potential to improve regulators’ ability to anticipate and 
detect financial misconduct. 
1.  Incentives 
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), creating section 21F, which 
provides incentives for whistleblowers to report violations of the 
federal securities laws.84 The program is implemented by the SEC and 
serves the “important goals of prevention, timely detection, and 
effective enforcement of securities law violations.”85 In broad 
overview, it allows the SEC, in its discretion, to make award 
payments to “whistleblowers who voluntarily provide[] original 
information to the Commission that [leads] to [a] successful 
enforcement” action that recovers at least $1 million.86 The SEC 
adopted final rules to implement the Dodd-Frank program in May 
2011, which rules became effective in August 2011.87 
The program is based on incentives, of which there are three. 
One is a cash bounty. The program provides that whistleblowers may 
be entitled to ten to thirty percent of any sanction collected where the 
amount is over $1 million.88 The second incentive is protection from 
 
111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski, Member, H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs.). 
 84. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, §	21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §	78u-6 (2012)). A whistleblower, under the SEC rules, is anyone 
who “provide[s] the Commission with information [that] relates to a possible violation of 
the Federal securities laws (including any rules or regulations thereunder) that has 
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.” 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-2(a)(1) (2015). 
 85. Kathleen L. Casey, Adoption of Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower 
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC (May 25, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-item2.htm [http://perma.cc/RC5V-
56CU] [hereinafter Casey Statement]. 
 86. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 922, §	21F, 124 Stat. at 1841–42. 
 87. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release 
No. 64,545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule 
Release]. Although the Dodd-Frank Act set many requirements of the program,  
the Commission has exercised its discretion in this rulemaking to propose rules 
that contain several key definitional or interpretive provisions that help define the 
scope of the program, and procedures that whistleblowers will be required to 
follow to submit information to the Commission and to apply for awards under the 
Program	.	.	.	. 
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 63,237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 
70,514–15 (proposed Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Whistleblower Rule]. 
 88. 17 C.F.R. §§	240.21F-3(a)(4), 240.21F-5(b). 
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workplace retaliation.89 Recently, the SEC has made clear that it 
intends to vigorously pursue employers that retaliate. As evidence of 
this, in April 2015, the Commission announced an award in 
connection with its first ever retaliation case.90 There, a whistleblower 
received over $600,000 for information regarding undisclosed trading 
activity in violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.91 But the 
SEC also charged the company, Paradigm Capital Management, with 
retaliating against the whistleblower by removing him from his 
position, requiring him to investigate the misconduct he had reported, 
altering his job duties, and generally “marginalizing [him].”92 The 
third incentive is confidentiality; a whistleblower’s identity will not be 
disclosed to the public, absent limited exceptions.93 A whistleblower 
can also submit information anonymously through an attorney.94 
The number of tips has grown in each year of the program’s 
existence. In fiscal year 2015, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower95 
received nearly 4,000 tips—a slight increase from the 3,620 tips in 
2014 and 3,238 in 2013; and a more pronounced increase from the 
3,001 tips in 2012 and 334 tips in 2011.96 Most commonly, the SEC 
receives information pertaining to corporate disclosures and 
financials, followed by securities offering fraud and securities 
 
 89. 15 U.S.C. §	78u-6(h) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-2(b). The anti-retaliation 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program expanded on the whistleblower 
program put in place by section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was also 
passed in response to corporate fraud. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, sec. 806, §	1514A, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §	1514A 
(2012)). 
 90. Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,826, 2015 WL 
1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015); see Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
72,393, 2014 WL 2704311 (June 16, 2014). 
 91. See sources cited supra note 90; see also SEC Announces Award to Whistleblower 
in First Retaliation Case, SEC (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
75.html [http://perma.cc/W7MP-KHBD]. 
 92. SEC Announces Award to Whistleblower in First Retaliation Case, supra note 91; 
see Alexandra Stevenson, S.E.C. Fines Hedge Fund in Demotion of Whistle-Blowing 
Employee, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014, 8:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/16
/s-e-c-fines-firm-over-whistle-blower-retaliation/?_php=true&_type=blogs&module
=BlogPost-Title&version=Blog%20Main&contentCollection=Legal/Regulatory&action
=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/WL4N-EWMS] (identifying 
the whistleblower as former head trader James Nordgaard). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-7(a) (2015). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower [http://perma.cc
/FDJ3-L52W]. 
 96. SEC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT], 
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7PZD-CS8E]. 
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manipulation.97 For example, according to the SEC’s most recent 
annual report to Congress, several awards were made in connection 
with misconduct in the financial services industry, involving “Ponzi-
like schemes” and “false or misleading statements” in offering 
memoranda, marketing materials, or price information.98 So far, the 
SEC has made twenty-two awards in connection with sixteen different 
matters.99 
2.  Expansion 
Regulators have been pushing to strengthen and expand the 
program over the past several years. Domestically, the SEC has made 
clear its commitment to the program by pressing the private market 
to cooperate. Not only has the SEC expressed its commitment to 
pursuing retaliation suits,100 but it has also punished companies for 
chilling whistleblowing in other ways. In that vein, employment 
contracts have been a focus. In April 2015, the SEC announced a 
settlement with KBR Inc. (a Houston-based engineering and 
construction company) regarding language in that company’s 
confidentiality agreements that “undermine[d] the purpose of Section 
21F and Rule 21F-17(a).”101 The SEC found that the language in the 
agreements, which prohibited employees from discussing internal 
investigations with outside parties—including, presumably, the 
government—violated Exchange Act Rule 21F-17(a): that “[n]o 
person may take any action to impede an individual from 
communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible 
securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, 
a confidentiality agreement	.	.	.	with respect to such 
communications.”102 
The SEC has also been pressing for a more expansive definition 
of “whistleblowers” through amicus briefs in federal court.103 In the 
SEC’s view, where the statute’s antiretaliation provisions are 
concerned, the definition of whistleblower includes those who report 
internally, to the firm, as well as those who report to the 
 
 97. Id. at 22. 
 98. Id. at 17. 
 99. Id. at 12, 16. 
 100. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 101. KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 102. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-17(a) (2015). 
 103. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Appellant, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2015), https://www
.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2015/daniel-berman-020615.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YT4-87VC]. 
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Commission.104 Finally, there has been some suggestion that the 
Department of Justice would like to extend whistleblower programs 
in the financial crime arena as well.105 
Whistleblower programs are also expanding abroad. On the 
domestic end, the SEC has been clear that it welcomes information 
from citizens living or residing abroad. Since the program’s beginning, 
it has received tips from over ninety-five different countries and has 
made awards in three different matters where the whistleblower lived 
abroad.106 In the Commission’s view, the program has a “global 
scope.”107 
The European Union has also shown some commitment to 
augmenting whistleblower programs. A 2014 EU Regulation on 
Market Abuse required that all European Union member states 
implement a whistleblower program in their respective jurisdictions 
by 2016 (with respect to violations of the market abuse directive).108 
The United Kingdom also recently strengthened its stance on 
whistleblowers. Its existing whistleblower statute, the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act of 1998 (“PIDA”), “protect[s] individuals who make 
certain disclosures of information in the public interest.”109 
Specifically, PIDA protects individuals who make “qualifying 
disclosures” to their employer or another person or government 
entity that is responsible for the issues being disclosed.110 This 
 
 104. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 75,592, 2015 WL 4624264 
(Aug. 4, 2015). 
 105. Barrett, supra note 15. 
 106. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 12, 24. 
 107. Id. at 12. 
 108. Council Regulation 596/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1, 14 ¶	74, 16, 33 (EU). 
 109. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1998/23 [http://perma.cc/VHY9-P7N9]; see David Lewis, A.J. Brown & Richard 
Moberly, Whistleblowing, Its Importance and the State of Research, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON WHISTLEBLOWING RESEARCH 1, 359 (A.J. Brown et al. eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWING HANDBOOK]. 
 110. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23, §	1 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1998/23 [http://perma.cc/VHY9-P7N9]. A protected qualifying disclosure is one 
that an employee reasonably believes in good faith is in the public interest and that  
tends to show one or more of the following: (a) that a criminal offence has been 
committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has 
failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation	.	.	.	,	(c) that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the 
health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, 
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that 
information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding 
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 
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includes, for example, disclosures made to the United Kingdom’s 
Serious Fraud Office regarding instances of past or ongoing economic 
crimes.111 
In the financial services context specifically, England’s prudential 
bank regulators, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and the 
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority, have noted that 
whistleblowers “play an important role in helping to protect the 
safety and soundness of firms.”112 And in the summer of 2015, the 
FCA announced new rules for deposit-takers, certain investment 
firms, and insurers regarding internal whistleblower mechanisms.113 In 
contrast to the U.S.-SEC model, however, the new U.K. rules do not 
incentivize or impose a duty on employees to report “concerns” to 
regulators.114 Rather, the rules require financial firms to go beyond 
what is required by PIDA, to implement procedures for handling a 
wider range of “reportable concerns.”115 
*	*	* 
This Part has sought to frame the debate about whistleblower 
programs in terms of current and anticipated challenges that 
innovation in the current global economic environment poses for 
financial regulation and enforcement. It first provided some context 
for why private assistance is necessary to aid public enforcement at 
all—because innovation, and the complexity and diffusion it brings, 
has and will likely continue to overwhelm regulatory resources and 
create fertile environments for misconduct.116 Then, this Part 
 
Id. 
 111. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, GUIDELINES ON MAKING A PUBLIC INTEREST 
DISCLOSURE, 2013, at 4 (UK), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/34779/Guidelines_on_making
_a_public_interest_disclosure.pdf [http://perma.cc/65FQ-KTEJ]. 
 112. BANK OF ENGLAND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY & FINANCIAL 
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS, 2014, ¶	1, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/financial-incentives-for-whistleblowers.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6SAA-QWRM]. 
 113. Whistleblowing in Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Investment Firms and 
Insurers 2015, PS 15/24, ¶¶	1.1, 1.7 (UK); FCA Introduces New Rules on Whistleblowing, 
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June, 10, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-introduces-new-
rules-on-whistleblowing [http://perma.cc/SCX7-E3LY]. 
 114. Whistleblowing in Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Investment Firms and 
Insurers 2015, PS 15/24, ¶¶	1.15, 2.24, 2.27. 
 115. See Accountability and Whistleblowing Instrument 2015, FCA 2015/46, Annex 
A(1) (defining a “reportable concern” as “(a) anything that would be the subject-matter of 
a protected disclosure, including breaches of rules; (b) a breach of the firm’s policies and 
procedures; and (c) behavior that harms or is likely to harm the reputation or financial 
well-being of the firm”). 
 116. Awrey has also noted several ways in which innovation (and complexity) 
contribute to regulatory asymmetries. He argues: “Complexity and innovation have 
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surveyed one attempted solution: whistleblower programs, both in the 
United States, under the aegis of the SEC, and abroad, with fledging 
expansion in the European Union and United Kingdom. Drawing on 
this framework, which casts whistleblower programs as desirable 
(indeed, necessary), the balance of this Article aims to strengthen the 
integrity and quality of postcrisis whistleblower programs by 
reexamining their benefits and costs in light of the contemporary 
marketplace. 
II.  A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Part I highlighted three areas of the global financial markets in 
which regulatory asymmetries—informational and expertise gaps 
between regulators and the private market—frustrate regulatory 
supervision and give rise to opportunity for misconduct. This Part 
evaluates whistleblower solutions from a cost-benefit perspective. 
Section II.A first provides some theoretical framework for a cost-
benefit analysis of whistleblower programs, and the SEC 
whistleblower program in particular. Section II.B then engages in a 
conceptual analysis of the various benefits of the whistleblower 
program, both observable and hypothetical. Section II.C then sets out 
the costs and unintended consequences of a strong, highly 
incentivized whistleblower program. Ultimately, Part II argues that 
the strong U.S. model is, on balance, desirable when one weighs the 
benefits of whistleblower laws against their costs. 
A. Framing the Analysis 
Strictly speaking, independent agencies, like the Commission, are 
not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis—although historically 
(since the 1980s), the Commission has voluntarily done so as a matter 
of “good regulatory practice.”117 Yet this practice was altered slightly 
 
combined to generate significant asymmetries of information and expertise within 
financial markets, thereby	.	.	.	exacerbating already pervasive agency cost problems. At the 
same time, the pace of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation chronically 
behind the curve.” Awrey, supra note 17, at 238–39.  
 117. Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Concerning Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking: 
Before the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private 
Programs Oversight and Government Reform Committee U.S. House of Representatives, SEC 
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Testimony/Detail/Testimony/1365171489400 
[http://perma.cc/74EM-J4P7] [hereinafter SEC Rulemaking Testimony] (“When the 
Commission engages in rulemaking, it strives to adopt rules that further that mission 
without imposing unjustified costs. Understanding the potential economic consequences of 
rules the Commission is considering is an integral component of that process.”). There are 
two provisions, however, that require the SEC to consider the likely impact of its rules. 
One provides that the SEC “shall not adopt any rule or regulation which would impose a 
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after the crisis. Given the significant rulemaking burden that the 
Dodd-Frank Act imposed,118 the Commission adopted the position 
that little cost-benefit analysis (if any at all) was necessary in areas 
where Congress had left the Commission no discretion.119 So, for 
example, when section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act required the 
Commission to “revise Regulation FD	.	.	.	to remove from such 
regulation the exemption for entities whose primary business is the 
issuance of credit ratings[,]”120 the Commission did not include a cost-
benefit analysis on the ground that “any costs and benefits to the 
economy resulting from the amendments are mandated by the [Dodd-
Frank] Act.”121 
Likewise, in connection with the final whistleblower rule, the 
Commission engaged in a cost-benefit analysis only with respect to 
those elements of the program where the SEC planned to exercise its 
discretion122: (1) in defining the terms “Voluntary Submission of 
Information,” “Independent Knowledge,” and “Information that 
Leads to Successful Enforcement”; (2) an additional (i.e., non-
statutory) factor used to determine the amount of the award paid to a 
whistleblower;123 (3) a few additional criteria for award eligibility, 
 
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate” to advance the purposes of the 
securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §	78w(a)(2) (2012). The other requires the SEC, when it “is 
engaged in rulemaking,” to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether 
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 15 U.S.C. §	78c(f) 
(2012). 
 118. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified Aug. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc
/2JPD-DL4F]. 
 119. SEC Rulemaking Testimony, supra note 117. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit effectively 
conceded in the conflict minerals case that where Congress mandates a rule that is not 
based on investor protection—and did not do cost-benefit analysis—the Commission may 
not be required to do cost-benefit analysis. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 
369 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 120. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §	939B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887–88 (2010). 
 121. Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption for Credit Rating Agencies, 
Securities Act Release No. 9146, Exchange Act Release No. 63,003, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 29,448, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,050, 61,051	(Oct. 4, 2010). 
 122. Regarding this final rule, Commissioner Casey stated that 
[t]he Commission has taken the view that it is only required to analyze costs and 
benefits flowing from the Commission’s exercise of its discretionary authority. 
This approach is too narrow and improperly limits the scope and regulatory value 
of cost-benefit analysis. In the context of the current rule, this approach has led us 
to drastically underestimate the costs of the whistleblower program. 
Casey Statement, supra note 85. 
 123. Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 87, at 70,515. This additional factor is 
“whether the award otherwise enhances the Commission’s ability to enforce the Federal 
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namely, certain types of cooperation and the exclusion from eligibility 
of anyone who was a “member, officer, or employee” of a foreign 
government at the time information was acquired; (4) specifications 
regarding the procedures required to submit information and claim an 
award; (5) the exclusion from the $1 million threshold of any 
sanctions that the whistleblower is required to pay; and (6) authority 
for the Commission to communicate directly with “[any] 
whistleblower who is a director, officer, member, agent, or employee 
of an entity that has counsel [and] has initiated communications with 
the Commission.”124 
The result was a little over five pages of cost-benefit analysis in 
the proposed rule.125 Therein, the crux of the Commission’s analysis 
focused on the rule’s benefits, citing the “strong incentives” that the 
proposed definitions created for whistleblowers “to provide 
information early, rather than waiting to receive a request or inquiry 
from a relevant authority.”126 As an additional benefit, the 
Commission believed that its definitions were well tailored to reduce 
the incidence of low-quality tips by, for example, requiring 
information that “significantly contributed to the success of an 
[enforcement] action” or “would not otherwise have been obtained 
and was essential to the success of the action.”127 As for the costs, for 
the most part the Commission limited its analysis to potential costs 
the rule would impose on whistleblowers, with much less 
consideration for the costs that might arise in the financial services 
industry or society more broadly.128 
 Since that analysis was performed, however, regulators and 
scholars have continued to debate the appropriate model of cost-
benefit analysis in financial regulation. In general, the trend has 
favored more robust analysis before new rules are imposed.129 
Congress, for example, has introduced bills that would give the 
 
securities laws, protect investors, and encourage the submission of high quality 
information from whistleblowers.” Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 70,514–18. 
 126. Id. at 70,516. 
 127. Id. Notably, however, the final rule loosened this standard, requiring only 
“original information	.	.	.	[t]hat leads to successful enforcement.” 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-3(a) 
(2015). 
 128. See Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 87, at 70,517–18. 
 129. As Professor John Coates has written, a recent “movement is afoot to impose 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on financial regulation (CBA/FR).” John C. Coates IV, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 
885 (2015) (noting that the substantial reforms imposed by Dodd-Frank “reignited 
criticism for failure to base the changes on adequate CBA/FR”). 
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president authority to require independent agencies to conduct cost-
benefit analysis of their financial regulation.130 And although the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Commission is not 
required “to measure the immeasurable,”131 it arguably should still 
“determine as best it can the economic implications of [a] rule.”132 
Indeed, the Commission itself has since changed its position; now, 
“[t]he new guidance	.	.	.	states that as a policy matter, where a statute 
directs rulemaking, rulewriting staff should consider the overall 
economic impacts, including both those attributable to Congressional 
mandates and those that result from an exercise of the Commission’s 
discretion.”133 In perhaps another paradigm shift, academics have 
begun defending the virtues of conceptual—over strictly 
quantitative—cost-benefit analysis. Scholars like Professor John 
Coates and Professor David Zaring, while resisting “efforts to impose 
judicially reviewed, quantified, [cost-benefit analysis] on independent 
financial agencies,” have urged the importance of conceptual cost-
benefit analysis, which “could lead to better policy and	.	.	.	advance 
the substantive project of quantitative [cost-benefit analysis] itself.”134 
At this juncture in the evolution of the cost-benefit analysis of 
financial regulation, academics and policy makers alike should be 
interested in revisiting the costs and benefits of the whistleblower 
program. It also seems productive to do so, given that the contours, 
boundaries, definitions, and trajectory of whistleblower programs 
globally remain in flux. Accordingly, the balance of this Part aims to 
 
 130. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S. 1173, 113th Cong. 
§	3(a)(6); Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. 
§	3(a)(6). 
 131. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Inv. Co. 
Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 132. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, as 
David Zaring points out, 
The court’s interest in cost-benefit analysis might be said to have two degrees in 
intensity. The first, a requirement that the S.E.C. do one, and do it carefully, 
appears to have been internalized by the agency. A second, more intensive, cost-
benefit analysis would require a quantification of the costs and benefits. That 
component has never been definitively imposed on the agency by the circuit court, 
and the S.E.C. appears to be willing to propose rules that lack this sort of 
quantitative justification. 
David Zaring, The State of Cost-Benefit Analysis at the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/the-state-of-cost-benefit-analysis-at
-the-sec.html [http://perma.cc/5S64-YE49 (dark archive)]. 
 133. SEC Rulemaking Testimony, supra note 117. 
 134. Coates, supra note 129, at 886; see Zaring, supra note 132 (explaining that “[i]f we 
must have costs and benefits, perhaps it is good that the S.E.C. is trying to preserve 
flexibility about how it defines them”). 
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update the Commission’s initial cost-benefit analysis, so that scholars 
and regulators can reflect on how to move forward. To be sure, with 
the benefit of four years of hindsight and data, the nature of this post 
hoc cost-benefit analysis will be quite distinct from that which is 
ordinarily performed before a rule becomes final. Nonetheless, given 
the extent to which regulators worldwide are prepared to embrace 
and expand whistleblower programs, it is worthwhile to engage in a 
reanalysis of their costs and benefits, drawing on the United States’ 
recent experience.135 
B. Whistleblowing and Its Benefits 
In the financial regulation context, whistleblowing programs 
have several conceptual and observable benefits. To begin, as the 
Commission’s experience suggests, one (arguably principal) benefit of 
a whistleblower program is that it can be effective in assisting the 
government to detect financial misconduct. There are other, perhaps 
less appreciated, benefits to whistleblowing programs as well, 
including a more efficient use of government resources, enhanced 
market discipline, and improved industry ethics, which can enhance 
the legitimacy of the industry and, along with it, consumer confidence. 
1.  Regulatory Gaps 
In theory, whistleblowers programs are designed to aid the 
government in filling regulatory gaps. Whistleblowers—who are most 
often individuals within the financial industry136—have the knowledge 
and expertise that government regulators often lack, but which is 
 
 135. Consistent with Professors Coates’s and Zaring’s view, Sections II.B and II.C 
likewise engage in a principally conceptual cost-benefit analysis. See also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS: 
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND 
COORDINATION 19 (2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-032, 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE 
FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 3, 13 (2007) (“Measuring regulatory benefits 
remains [a] challenge largely because of the difficulty in quantifying benefits such as 
improved consumer protection or financial stability [in the context of financial services 
regulation.]	.	.	.	While regulation provides a broad assurance of the strength of financial 
markets, it is difficult to measure those benefits, in part because regulations seeking to 
ensure financial stability aim to prevent low-probability, high-cost events.”); Coates, supra 
note 129, at 894–95 (noting that “full quantification in CBA/FR is likely to be difficult 
because finance is at the heart of the economy, involves groups of people (firms, markets) 
interacting in complex, difficult-to-study ways, and is shaped by forces that change rapidly 
over time”). 
 136. See 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 16 (“[T]o date, almost half 
of the award recipients were current or former employees of the company on which they 
reported information of wrongdoing.”). 
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necessary to detect many cases of financial misconduct.137 Precisely as 
Professor Saule Omarova has argued, “[p]rivate industry actors may 
be in the best position to identify and understand underlying trends in 
the increasingly complex financial markets and to gather and analyze, 
in real time, information most relevant to systemic risk 
management.”138 With four years of data to draw on, it appears that, 
in practice, whistleblowers are effective at detecting misconduct.139 In 
sixteen different matters,140 whistleblowers have provided government 
regulators with inside information about past or ongoing misconduct, 
thereby overcoming the government’s traditional resource limitations. 
Whistleblowers can help regulators overcome their resource gaps 
in two distinct ways. First, whistleblowers play an early-warning role. 
Recent examples are instructive. In the fall of 2014, the SEC paid a 
$30 million award—its largest yet—to a foreign tipster for 
information about an ongoing fraud that, as the SEC described, 
would have been difficult to detect without the whistleblower’s 
help.141 Considering that whistleblower awards are calculated at ten to 
thirty percent of the total recovery, the fraud that whistleblower 
disclosed had presumably already caused losses or damage between 
$100 and $300 million. Since the fraud was “ongoing,”142 one can 
assume that those losses would have increased without the 
whistleblower’s information. 
In 2015, the financial markets were again presumably spared 
from significant harm when a firm employee disclosed to the SEC 
that Bank of America’s (“BOA”) London-based affiliate was 
involved in extensive “dividend arbitrage” in the context of 
international tax laws.143 It made several whistleblowing submissions 
 
 137. See supra Section I.A (discussing areas of innovative financial activity where 
regulatory gaps exists). 
 138. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry 
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 418 (2011).  
 139. Full details of whistleblower cases are difficult to know because the government 
usually promises confidentiality in exchange for the information. However, it is possible to 
parse some critical facts from media reports and SEC press releases and annual reports to 
Congress. See, e.g., Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,826, 2015 
WL 1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015) (awarding over $600,000 to head trader who had been 
demoted after providing information to SEC). 
 140. See 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 16. 
 141. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower Award, Its Largest Yet, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-million-whistleblower-
award-its-largest-yet-1411406612# [http://perma.cc/LF3W-Z5RW (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jenny Strasburg, Bank of America’s U.S. Deposit-Taking Unit Financed Tax Trades, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-americas-u-s-deposit-taking
-unit-financed-tax-trades-1423666493 [http://perma.cc/L8LY-QZ42 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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about BOA’s “	‘increasingly aggressive and reckless’ tax-avoidance 
trades,” which put the bank at risk of “serious financial and 
reputational damage.”144 Also in 2015, the SEC announced that 
another payment would be made, of about $1.5 million,145 to a 
compliance officer “who had a reasonable basis to believe that 
disclosure to the SEC was necessary to prevent imminent misconduct 
from causing substantial financial harm to the company or 
investors.”146 The language of the SEC disclosure, though necessarily 
vague, suggests that losses were averted thanks to the whistleblower 
submission. Based on these few examples, it appears that in 
performing this early-warning function, whistleblowers have played a 
part in mitigating potential market losses by muting the impact of 
nascent misconduct.147 
Second, data also suggest that whistleblowers may provide some 
deterrent value by increasing the chances (and possibly speed with 
which) misconduct is detected. The case of the “flash crash” of 2010—
in which the Dow Jones suddenly dropped by one thousand points—
is particularly telling.148 For five years, regulators had thought that the 
crash was caused by the innocuous trades of a mainstream trading 
house, made at a time of macroeconomic unease.149 In 2015, however, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Department of 
Justice filed charges against a London-based trader, alleging that the 
crash was caused by his manipulative “spoofing” of a certain stock 
index.150 Apparently, that information was learned from a 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,781, 2015 WL 1814377 (Apr. 22, 2015). 
 146. SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer, SEC 
(Apr. 22, 2015) (emphasis added), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-73.html 
[http://perma.cc/88XV-K578]. 
 147. See supra Part I. 
 148. Aruna Viswanatha, Bradley Hope & Jenny Strasburg, ‘Flash Crash’ Charges Filed, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-man-arrested-on-charges-tied-
to-may-2010-flash-crash-1429636758 [http://perma.cc/7R3X-AMJB (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Civil Complaint at 2, 20, 21, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nav Sarao 
Futures Ltd., No. 1:15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public
/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfsaraocomplaint041715.pdf [http://perma
.cc/8Q7A-3PVF]; Criminal Complaint at 1, 3, United States v. Singh Sarao, No. 1:15-cr-00075 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2015/04/21/sarao_criminal_complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PQA-WYDG]; 
Dave Michaels, Matthew Leising & Sam Mamudi, Flash Crash Arrest Lays Bare Regulatory 
Lapses at All Levels, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-04-22/flash-crash-arrest-lays-bare-regulatory-lapses-at-all-levels [http://perma.cc/Y2K4-
FZED]. 
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whistleblower’s submission, but was unknown to regulators for these 
past five years.151 
Consistent with this anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence 
further suggests that whistleblowers are generally better at 
uncovering fraud than government supervisory authorities acting 
alone. Congress has reported that in the past four years 
whistleblowers have uncovered 54.1% of frauds in public companies, 
versus the 4.1% detected by the SEC and external auditors.152 In 
theory, then, robust whistleblower programs that effectively attract 
insider information should disincentivize would-be perpetrators of 
misconduct, assuming that such actors recognize the increased risks of 
detection and punishment associated with misconduct. 
2.  Regulatory Efficiency 
There are a number of economic reasons why governments rely 
on the private sector to provide public services. One standard 
rationale for privatization or outside contracting is that private-sector 
actors will perform the jobs for which they are hired with greater 
efficiency than their government counterparts, whose government 
salaries and career security fail to provide the same motivating 
incentives. Relatedly, competitive pressures in the private sector 
should force private actors to perform with better quality and at lower 
cost than a government service provider would. In short, whereas 
government service providers have no reason to perform a job as 
efficiently as possible because the workflow is guaranteed, private-
sector actors vie for government contracts and must therefore 
outperform the competition.153 
 
 151. See Viswanatha et al., supra note 148. 
 152. SEN. REP. ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 6, at 110. On the punishment 
side, research has found that whistleblower involvement in a government investigation has 
resulted in higher sanctions, in the form of increased firm or individual fines, and greater 
prison sentences. Andrew C. Call et al., The Impact of Whistleblowers on Financial 
Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions 4–5 (Dec. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506418 [http://perma.cc/TC26-HAHV]. 
“The results of this analysis suggest whistleblower involvement in enforcement actions 
accounts for 27.5% of total penalties assessed in all enforcement actions from 1978–2012 
and increase[d] the length of prison sentences for culpable employees by more than 
[twenty-five] months	.	.	.	.” Id. at 6. The prospect of more severe penalties could also be 
expected to have some deterrent effect. 
 153. See generally William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A 
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 321 (2001) 
(documenting and summarizing empirical findings on the benefits of privatization). But see 
Molly Ball, The Privatization Backlash, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2014/04/city-state-governments-privatization-contracting-backlash
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On these rationales, state, local, and federal governments have 
increasingly relied on the private sector to perform some of its core 
responsibilities.154 During and after the Reagan Administration, the 
executive branch took the view that the American bureaucracy had 
become “inefficient and bloated” in past decades and that a 
downsized government supplemented with public-private 
partnerships would be more productive and cost effective.155 In many 
ways, this philosophy of utilizing the private sector for public services 
transformed the regulatory machinery of the United States. Today, 
many state and local governments lease toll roads, bridges, and 
tunnels to private contractors—as well as a range of other services, 
including utilities, corrections, education, and medical services.156 
Similar efficiency theories motivated early corporate 
whistleblower programs as well. Although initially resisted as 
“panoptic,” “whistleblowing as a source of information” about 
wrongdoing within the firm ultimately found its “legitimacy as 
countering organizational inefficiency.”157 Relying, in part, on 
information from whistleblowers actually allowed firms to reduce 
employee regulation, on the ground that whistleblowers could play a 
cost-saving deterrence function.158 
Outsourcing financial supervision (in part) to private citizens can 
yield several economic gains in the securities law context as well. For 
one, it accomplishes more comprehensive monitoring at lower 
taxpayer cost. To prophylactically monitor all financial activity—
particularly that which is innovative and diffuse—would be 
extraordinarily costly for the state to accomplish.159 The federal 
 
/361016/ [http://perma.cc/L97K-BP2A] (noting that in recent years, “the public impression of 
privatization as a panacea for the inherent inefficiency of government has been tarnished”). 
 154. See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government 
Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 399 (2006) (citing PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF 
GOVERNMENT 1–3 (1999)). 
 155. Id. at 417–18; see John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization 
Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov–Dec. 1991, at 26, 26; Paul R. Verkuil, 
Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1993). 
 156. COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, STATE OF ILL., 
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION: HISTORY, EXAMPLES, AND ISSUES 9–19 (2006). 
 157. See WIM VANDEKERCKHOVE, WHISTLEBLOWING AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 139 (2006). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Federal 
agencies have limited resources, and the SEC in particular is often outgunned by the 
affluent defendants that it sues.”); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. 
Supp. 525, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“Private litigation aids effective enforcement of the 
securities laws because private plaintiffs prosecute violations that might otherwise go 
undetected due to the SEC’s limited resources.” (quoting Note, Private Causes of Action 
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government would have to employ hundreds of public-sector 
employees simply to learn the mechanics of new financial products, 
not to mention to keep enough eyes on the ground. Where global 
institutions and markets are concerned, there are additional 
transaction costs (both economic and political) involved with 
allocating monitoring responsibility between sovereigns. Yet private 
individuals who are industry insiders are already placed (and trained) 
to perform these kinds of monitoring tasks; whistleblower programs 
incentivize them to do so, for only a relatively small portion of 
enforcement damages collected.160 
Furthermore, whistleblower programs may create secondary 
efficiency gains. For one, to the extent regulators can rely on 
whistleblowers as early-warning systems, they can then also rely less 
heavily on other forms of top-down regulation that may be more 
costly for firms.161 Moreover, firms may realize efficiency gains to the 
extent that whistleblower programs make the industry safer and more 
stable. Misconduct in one institution often imposes significant costs 
on others, by damaging consumer confidence in finance or inviting 
more (and more costly) regulatory scrutiny and regulation to the 
industry as a whole.162 Accordingly, if whistleblower programs are 
successful in reducing misconduct in the industry writ large, 
eventually firm-level regulatory and legal costs may decrease. 
Finally, whistleblower programs may serve public welfare goals. 
Public choice theory generally posits that government regulation can 
become dysfunctional when regulators are beholden to private 
interests.163 This phenomenon, known as “capture,” bears out “the 
idea that powerful organizations with private interests may capture 
 
for Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5; A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1963 n.24 (1987))). 
 160. Whistleblowers are compensated through an Investor Protection Fund, 
established by Congress, which is funded by sanctions collected by the SEC. See 2015 
WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 27. 
 161. See Skinner, supra note 6, at 1588–1610 (discussing the economic merits of 
relaxing quantitative forms of regulation, like capital ratios, in exchange for qualitative, 
misconduct-oriented supervisory regulation). 
 162. See id. (discussing the social and economic costs of misconduct). 
 163. See Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It 
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 175–76 (2011). See 
generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND 
WHY THEY DO IT 76 (1989) (discussing “client politics” and the accompanying agency 
capture problem “when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, 
reasonably small interest (an industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs 
will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)”). 
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the government in order to foster their private goals.”164 Regulatory 
capture thus results when certain influential members of an industry 
are able to persuade state regulators to use the power of the state to 
establish or enforce rules at the public’s expense—by doing so, 
industry’s “influence” is “disproportionate to the balance of interests 
envisaged when the regulatory system was established.”165 
Some scholars have argued that finance is particularly susceptible 
to capture.166 It is a “highly complex field, mastered only by a small 
class of people.”167 And this class of elite, specialized professionals is 
incentivized “to construct interests and preferences in a way that 
favours laissez-faire regulation.”168 In this vein, the public has 
criticized the SEC and the Department of Justice for failing to punish 
financial actors for the causes of the financial crisis.169 Though existing 
accounts of capture theory do not definitively explain why this 
phenomenon occurs, resource limitations are, at least in part, to 
blame; where the regulator depends on the regulated in the industry 
for critical information—to understand how the industry works—the 
resulting rules may favor the industry’s special interests.170 
 
 164. Frédéric Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited—Lessons from Economics of 
Corruption 4 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.icgg.org/downloads
/Boehm%20-%20Regulatory%20Capture%20Revisited.pdf [http://perma.cc/2L4J-3K3C]. 
 165. Baxter, supra note 163, at 176–78. 
 166. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 177–78, 185 (2012); see also Kevin L. Young, 
Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the Transnational 
Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 19 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 663, 
664 (2012). 
 167. Douglas Sarro, Rational Choices, but for Whom? Transnational Financial 
Regulation After the Crisis, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 455, 460 (2011) (reviewing 
BRUMMER, supra note 166). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-
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Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-
why-no-executive-prosecutions [http://perma.cc/VJ7H-FR7T]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities 
Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/03/11/big-banks-go-wrong-but-pay-a-little-price/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7G3C-CZ6S]; 
Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 
[http://perma.cc/TLH6-8HJ8]. 
 170. See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 203, 203–04, 207, 210 (2006) (focusing in particular on Stigler’s principal-agent 
model, which emphasizes the asymmetric flow of information and influence between the 
regulator and regulated). 
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Whistleblower programs, however, may mitigate the costs 
associated with capture. Whistleblowers, though technically part of 
the industry, develop a fundamentally different kind of relationship 
with securities regulators—and for very different reasons. 
Whistleblowers are more likely motivated by financial rewards (or, 
possibly, morality) rather than a desire to curry long-term favor with 
regulators or influence over regulatory decision-making.171 Indeed, 
whistleblowing would not likely be an effective way to shape 
regulatory preferences. In theory then, to the extent regulators 
develop partnerships with whistleblowers to understand the industry 
and detect misconduct, these relationships could partially replace, or 
at least reduce regulators’ dependence on, the kinds of reliance-based 
industry relations that can give rise to capture costs.  
3.  Market Discipline 
Another benefit of whistleblower programs is their potential to 
improve market discipline. Market discipline generally refers to the 
actions of multiple actors in the marketplace—institutions, depositors, 
equity holders—in assessing the operations of any one individual 
institution and responding accordingly.172 Common examples of 
market discipline may include, in the most basic sense, selling one’s 
equity shares or withdrawing deposits in response to negative 
information about a financial institution. Institutions can also 
discipline each other by, for example, refusing to lend to each other 
or increasing the price to do so.173 As Kate Judge has written, banks 
have the ability to “discipline” other banks if they perceive them to 
be taking inappropriate risks.174 
Information is key to market discipline, as “market participants 
will impose meaningful discipline only to the extent that they can 
accurately assess the risks to which a bank is exposed.”175 Misconduct, 
however, can distort information or reduce its flow. False or 
 
 171. See id. at 214–15 (discussing the concept of the “revolving door,” where industry 
insiders move between the public and private sector throughout their careers). See 
generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making 
Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 61–62 (1992) (arguing that the desire to 
go out the revolving door accounts for two types of empirically recognized capture: 
“sympathy with the particular problems that regulated firms confront in meeting 
standards” and “identification with the industry”). 
 172. See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1277–78 (2013). 
 173. Id. at 1288–89. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1278; see Bartlett, supra note 18, at 382–83 (describing the disclosure 
requirements currently imposed on U.S. banks and calling for particular types of 
disclosure requirements as a means of improving market discipline). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
2016] WHISTLEBLOWERS & INNOVATION 897 
misleading disclosures in particular—the most common type of 
misconduct about which whistleblowers report to the SEC—decrease 
market participants’ ability to exercise effective discipline by 
diminishing their ability to accurately assess an institution’s financial 
activities and exposures. 
Whistleblowers, meanwhile, can increase information about a 
financial institution. First, whistleblowers can reduce the incidence of 
inaccurate financial statements. They can also indirectly funnel 
information to the public about the efficacy of a firm’s internal 
compliance system and frequency of its employees’ misconduct. 
Although whistleblowers’ tips are not public, if a tip yields legitimate 
information, then the repercussions are likely to become public 
knowledge. Commission investigations become visible to outsiders 
and regulatory actions—like lawsuits or fines—must be disclosed by a 
firm.176 By bringing more misconduct-related information to light, 
whistleblowing could thus trigger a disciplining effect whereby 
institutions withdraw from or decline to deal with those that have 
been involved in or associated with serious misconduct. 
With respect to large financial institutions in particular, these 
interbank consequences can be significant. As Judge writes, 
[a] disciplining bank can reduce its actual credit exposure to the 
disciplined bank by refusing to extend new loans or enter into 
new agreements with the bank, terminating existing 
arrangements, and seeking to exit current arrangements [with 
the bank] by assigning them to a third party.177 
The prospect of such market discipline that might follow a 
whistleblower’s tip may serve as a powerful deterrent (or incentive to 
improve compliance) in the first instance. 
4.  Public Participation 
Whistleblower programs also benefit the public and the markets 
by increasing civic participation in finance, consistent with a legal and 
regulatory tradition of providing the public with a role in enforcing 
certain laws that touch on key matters of public concern. 
 
 176. SEC Regulation S-K, Item 103, requires disclosure of “any material pending legal 
proceeding” or any material legal proceeding “known to be contemplated by 
governmental authorities.” 17 C.F.R. §	229.103 (2015). Notably, however, financial 
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Broadly speaking, there is a long history in the Anglo-Saxon 
legal tradition of allowing private citizens to assist the state in certain 
enforcement matters. Perhaps the earliest example of this is the use of 
the qui tam writ, which developed in the English common law.178 
Beginning in the thirteenth century, qui tam writs enabled private 
parties who had suffered private wrongs to bring suits in royal courts 
if determined to be in the royal (i.e., public) interest.179 Both in 
England and then later in colonial America, qui tam suits were used 
to help the state enforce public (usually criminal) laws at times when 
the state lacked an effective police force.180 Through the use of qui 
tam, private enforcers became such important stopgaps in the state’s 
enforcement machinery that the first statute codifying the qui tam 
writ in the fourteenth century also added incentives for private 
accusers to assist the state by affording them one-fourth of any share 
in the penalty imposed.181 
The qui tam writ later served as the basis for the U.S. False 
Claims Act (“FCA”) of 1863182—then known as the “Lincoln Law”—
which was addressed to the fraud perpetrated against the U.S. 
government by its suppliers during the Civil War.183 The FCA allowed 
private parties (“relators”) to bring suits on behalf of the United 
States for fraud against the federal government.184 If successful, the 
relators received a portion of the recovery as their “bounty.”185 Qui 
tam suits were not much used again until the 1980s, at which point 
they were reincarnated in a revised False Claims Act.186 Though 
deployed only spottily in the following decades, there were a good 
many FCA cases after the financial crisis.187 In the past few years, 
 
 178. Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83 
(1972). “Qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso” or “he who as 
much for the king as for himself.” Id. 
 179. Id. at 83–85. 
 180. Id. at 85–86, 95. 
 181. Id. at 86. 
 182. 31 U.S.C. §§	3729–3733 (2012). 
 183. RAJEEV K. GOEL & MICHAEL A. NELSON, BOFIT, EFFECTIVENESS OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION 5 (2013), http://www.suomenpankki
.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/pages/dp0913.aspx [http://perma.cc/LM9R-VTRY]. 
 184. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1246; see Zaring, supra note 35, at 1455–56. 
 185. Engstrom, supra note 17, at 1246. 
 186. See id. at 1270. 
 187. See Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in 
Fiscal Year 2014, DOJ (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 [http://perma.cc/VMB2-
UYLZ]. See generally Memorandum from William P. Barr, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., 
to Richard L. Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney Gen., Constitutionality of the Qui Tam 
Provisions of the False Claims Act (July 18, 1989), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
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enforcement agencies have attempted to hold accountable those 
actors that allegedly committed fraud.188 In fact, FCA suits have been 
used far more than criminal prosecutions to address misbehavior 
related to the crisis: the Justice Department recovered nearly $5 
billion from FCA actions in 2012, with $1.4 billion of that sum related 
to housing and mortgage fraud.189 Criminal prosecutions, on the other 
hand, have “been few and far between.”190 Given past success with qui 
tam, Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower rules “borrow[] heavily” from the 
FCA.191 
In parallel to the qui tam tradition, Congress has also given 
private citizens authority to enforce public law by other means where 
crucial public interests are at stake. These grants of authority are 
often stylized as private attorney general statutes. As Olatunde 
Johnson describes it, “[t]he case for the private attorney general	.	.	.	is 
that it supplements what even an ideally constituted, well-funded, and 
vigorous public enforcement agency could do.”192 “Private litigation 
engages the resources of a multitude of private actors in rooting out” 
some public law problem—classically civil rights violations.193 
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,194 a suit under section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act, the Supreme Court extended the private attorney 
general theory to the securities context,195 confirming that financial 
law was another area of key importance to the U.S. public.196 As 
interpreted by subsequent courts, the private attorney general theory 
justified not only authorizing (as with qui tam) but actually 
subsidizing suits that “effectuate[] a strong Congressional policy 
 
/olc/opinions/1989/07/31/op-olc-v013-p0207.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8JG-TDEQ] (discussing 
a series of ongoing federal questions and background information related to qui tam suits 
pending at the time of writing). 
 188. See Zaring, supra note 35, at 1411. 
 189. Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal 
Year 2014, supra note 187. 
 190. Zaring, supra note 35, at 1437. 
 191. Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: What the 
SEC Has Learned from the False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 28–29 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1566 [http://perma.cc
/RZA4-8GTG]. The Dodd-Frank whistleblower rules do not include a qui tam provision, 
however. Id. at 29. 
 192. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives 
in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1347 (2012). 
 193. Id. 
 194. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 195. Id. at 430–31; see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390–91 (1970) 
(equitably awarding attorney’s fees in a suit under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act). 
 196. See Mills, 396 U.S. at 396–97. 
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which has benefited a large class of people.”197 As a result, private 
citizens have the power to enforce the securities laws by bringing 
private suits for damages under a range of statutory grants. These 
“rights” of action can be found in section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5,198 section 22 of the 
Commodities Exchange Act,199 and section 1962(c) of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).200 
Financial whistleblower programs could thus be seen as part of 
this lengthy tradition of enlisting private citizens in matters of public 
regulatory concern and, specifically, affording the public an 
opportunity to hold financial actors accountable. When viewed in that 
light, whistleblower programs may offer some additional benefits 
arising from increased public expression and participation in the 
enforcement of financial regulation. Specifically, giving the public a 
stake in holding the industry accountable—even if for self-interested 
reasons—may improve the industry’s legitimacy. Even if somewhat 
intangible, such benefits could have real economic impact to the 
extent they bolster consumer confidence and overall financial 
stability.201 
5.  Financial Culture 
Finally, to the extent that whistleblower programs strengthen 
norms against misconduct in financial institutions, these programs 
may also improve financial culture and ethics.  
 
 197. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §	1988(b) (2012)). 
 198. See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 200 
(2d Cir. 2014) (referring to section 10(b) as “the basic antifraud provision of the U.S. 
securities laws”). 
 199. See Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 200. Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute provides for a civil cause of action by “[a]ny 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 
U.S.C. §	1964(c) (2012). 
 201. The Commission also considered benefits accruing from strengthened links 
between market stability and consumer trust: 
[O]ne of the issues that may affect capital formation in the economy is investor 
confidence in the sense of investors trusting in the fairness of financial markets, of 
which their perception of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the 
regulatory regime is an important part. If investors fear theft, fraud, manipulation, 
insider trading, or conflicted investment advice, their trust in the markets will be 
low, both in the primary market for issuance or in the secondary market for 
trading. This would increase the cost of raising capital, which would impair capital 
formation	.	.	.	.  
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Whistleblowing has an inherently ethical and moral dimension. 
Virtue ethics were in fact one of the earliest justifications for 
corporate whistleblower programs in the United States. As one 
scholarly account notes, “public administration ethics” in the first part 
of the twentieth century developed a certain “canon,” which endorsed 
the idea of the whistleblower.202 And by emphasizing or elevating the 
latent moral aspect of whistleblowing, regulators could leverage 
whistleblower programs as a means of improving the industry’s 
culture203—thus advancing another priority that is high on the 
regulatory agenda today.204 
To do so, regulators could frame whistleblowing in terms of the 
industry’s professional, ethical obligations. One way to do that is by 
orienting whistleblower goals within the established framework of 
industry self-regulation. Though support for industry self-regulation 
has ebbed and flowed in the past few decades, it is by now an 
embedded feature in the architecture of financial regulation. Today, 
many financial systems worldwide have significant self-governing 
aspects that work in tandem with government oversight. In the 
United States, for example, self-regulatory organizations like 
registered stock exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Association (“FINRA”) perform a number of day-to-day oversight 
and enforcement functions, which are ultimately overseen by the 
SEC.205 
At face value, whistleblower regimes fit well within the self-
regulatory paradigm as a system of informally delegated enforcement 
that operates by tapping into the industry’s first-hand insight into 
misconduct.206 And if approached as a matter of industry self-
 
 202. See H. George Frederickson, Searching for Virtue in the Public Life, in ETHICS IN 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 91, 95 (H. George Frederickson & Richard K. Ghere eds., 2d ed. 
2013). 
 203. Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 204. See, e.g., Alberto G. Musalem, Why Focus on Culture?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/mus151123 
[http://perma.cc/D7LB-L38S]. 
 205. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. Law No. 94-29, §	26(b), 89 Stat. 97, 
170 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	78f (2012)) (giving the Commission power to 
supervise SROs); see also Eric J. Pan, Organizing Regional Systems: The US Example, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 188, 198 (Niamh Moloney, Ellis 
Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015) (noting that in the past “[t]he SEC would oversee the 
SROs, but would only intervene if it determined that the SROs were failing to carry out 
their respective regulatory missions”). 
 206. See Omarova, supra note 138, at 434 n.85 (arguing the merits of industry self-
regulation and urging “attention to the regulatory potential of using the industry’s relative 
information advantage”). 
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regulation, whistleblower programs—like other self-regulatory 
measures—could contribute in a meaningful way to ethical standard 
setting in the financial services sector.207 More concretely, in a self-
regulatory approach to whistleblower programs, regulators would 
place significant emphasis on firm-level policies and procedures—that 
is, by fashioning rules that seek to strengthen the whistleblowing 
programs that operate internal to the industry. The United Kingdom 
provides an interesting model, where recent reforms require certain 
financial firms by March 2016 to designate a “whistleblowing 
champion,” a non-executive director whose role is to ensure the 
“integrity, independence and effectiveness” of the firm’s 
whistleblower’s policies.208  
This kind of regulatory innovation, which has a distinctly self-
regulatory flavor, has the potential to reduce the social and 
professional stigma that currently surrounds whistleblowing. And 
finding ways to motivate firms to internalize whistleblowing as a 
valuable and respected practice is an important step in fomenting a 
culture that disapproves of misconduct. As one group of 
commentators noted with respect to the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (“LIBOR”) scandal: “It is not enough to encourage the use of 
the whistleblowing mechanism if	.	.	.	employees are not encouraged to 
also challenge social conformity.”209 There, part of the problem was 
that industry actors did not recognize that their behavior in 
manipulating the benchmark was wrongful.210 
Delegating whistleblower requirements and responsibilities to 
firms and giving them some autonomy to shape and manage the 
process may be an effective way to cultivate such institutional and 
industry buy-in to whistleblowing in a way that has not quite taken 
hold vis-à-vis the SEC’s (externally oriented) program. Put 
differently, delegated whistleblower regimes might help to 
denormalize the kinds of misconduct that seem to have become 
 
 207. See generally 15 U.S.C. §	78f (2012). 
 208. See Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority, Whistleblowing in 
Deposit-Takers, PRA-Designated Firms and Insurers, Policy Statement PS24/15, at 8 
(Oct. 2015) (UK), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015
/ps2415.pdf [http://perma.cc/NZ56-GRW9]. 
 209. PWC, THREATS TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 16 (2014), https://www
.pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-gecs-2014-threats-to-the-
financial-services-sector.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8UM-C6PH]. 
 210. Id. 
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accepted as normal in the past several years—that is, improve the 
financial industry’s culture.211 
C. Whistleblowing and Its Costs 
Notwithstanding the benefits of whistleblowers, whistleblower 
programs are not cost free. The following Section explores the costs 
of whistleblower programs, particularly those that were not amply 
considered by the Commission in the proposed rule.212 
1.  Firm Compliance 
One of the industry’s more prominent concerns about 
whistleblower programs—at the program’s beginning and now—is 
that they can undermine internal firm compliance.213 Specifically, 
some have suggested that government programs, which incentivize 
employees to report misconduct externally, work at cross-purposes to 
firms’ ability to address misconduct in-house.214 The concern is that 
 
 211. Kaptein gives several reasons why organizational culture bears on an employee’s 
propensity to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, including because: (1) it “indicates 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior that employees take into account when they decide 
how to respond”; (2) it determines what kind of behavior is legitimate by empowering 
employees “to follow up reports of wrongdoing, as they and others know that responding 
to observed wrongdoing is consistent with the prevailing culture”; (3) and it shapes how 
employees respond since employees are less likely to respond to wrongdoing by blowing 
the whistle if they perceive it “as an effect of a failing ethical culture.” Muel Kaptein, 
From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical Culture of 
Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing 8–9 (Erasmus Research 
Inst. of Mgmt., Paper No. ERS-2009-047-ORG, 2009), http://repub.eur.nl/pub/16600/ERS-
2009-047-ORG.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD9G-Q5WZ]. 
 212. For an excellent analysis of the costs and benefits of whistleblower programs that 
complements this discussion, see Rose, supra note 17. 
 213. A compliance function is “an independent function that identifies, assesses, 
advises on, monitors and reports on” risk associated with failure to comply with laws, 
regulations, and “standards of good practice.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS ¶	10 (2003). 
Likewise, most corporations—especially in the financial industry—have some form of 
enterprise risk management, of which compliance is a part. Enterprise risk management 
involves systems and structures to deal with “agency cost control,” among other risks to 
the business. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 
J. CORP. L. 967, 981 (2009). 
 214. See Ebersole, supra note 17, at 137 (noting this criticism and arguing that internal 
compliance is more effective and efficient than external reporting). The Chamber of Commerce 
has argued that whistleblower programs “put trial lawyer profits ahead of effective compliance 
and corporate governance.” U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will 
Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (May 24, 2011), 
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-will-
undermine-corporate-compliance [http://perma.cc/B5TB-WBNE]. In a September 24, 2010 
hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services, the Senior Vice President for 
Policy and Advocacy at the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 
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the hefty cash bounties from the government will diminish an 
employee’s incentive to approach the firm with possible misconduct 
issues before turning to external regulators.215 As one Commissioner 
stated, “[a]n inherent risk of the approach adopted in the final rule, is 
that the monetary sums at stake will provide a significant enough 
incentive for whistleblowers to completely bypass internal reporting 
in favor of coming straight to the Commission.”216 In a similar vein, 
former Congressman Michael Oxley wrote that the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower provisions went “too far” by “incentiviz[ing] 
[whistleblowers] to go outside the structure of the company” and 
“significantly reduc[ing] the effectiveness of internal due process.”217 
In drafting the rules, the Commission did, apparently, attempt to 
mitigate this possible cost. As implemented, the program purports to 
“encourage[] [employees] to work within their company’s own 
compliance structure, if appropriate.”218 Accordingly, section 21F-
6(a)(4) provides that the Commission will consider, in determining 
the award, whether the whistleblower had reported internally.219 
Likewise, pursuant to section 21F-6(b)(3), the Commission can 
 
urged that “employee[s] will now have a significant financial incentive to bypass raising the 
issue with the company at all for fear of losing the bounty.” Executive Compensation 
Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (statement of Darla C. Stuckey, 
Senior Vice President, Policy and Advocacy, Society of Corporate Secretaries and 
Governance Professionals). But see Mary Jo White, The SEC as the Whistleblower’s 
Advocate, SEC (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-remarks-at-
garrett-institute.html [http://perma.cc/EN3G-YRXU] (stating that “[a]ll indications are that 
internal compliance functions are as strong as ever—if not stronger—and that insiders 
continue to report possible violations internally first”). 
 215. See Richard Carrigan & Asheesh Agarwal, How to Save Compliance Programs After 
Dodd-Frank, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/236114/how-to-save-
compliance-programs-after-dodd-frank [http://perma.cc/2LHW-N7MF]; Michael T. Gass & 
Michael R. Dube, The Problem with Compliance Whistleblowers, LAW360 (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/651304/the-problem-with-compliance-whistleblowers [http://
perma.cc/Q88H-XR9B] (noting that “many argue” that awarding compliance officers as 
whistleblowers “undermine[s] companies’ internal compliance function”); see also Rose, 
supra note 17, at 1278 (discussing this critique). 
 216. Casey Statement, supra note 85.  
 217. B. Nathaniel Garrett, Comment, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision Fails to 
Go Far Enough: Making the Case for a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 765, 766 (2012) (quoting E-mail from Mr. Michael G. 
Oxley, Of Counsel, Baker & Hostetler LLP, former Congressman and Chairman of the 
House Fin. Servs. Comm., to B. Nathaniel Garrett (Oct. 28, 2011, 2:54 PM) (on file with B. 
Nathaniel Garrett)). 
 218. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 4. 
 219. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-6(a)(4) (2015). 
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reduce the award amount if a whistleblower has interfered with 
internal compliance.220 
Still, as the program has developed, incentives to report 
externally in lieu of internally seem to loom larger each year. 
Recently, judicial and agency interpretations of the statutorily 
mandated aspects of the whistleblower provisions have further 
cemented employees’ incentives to report externally rather than 
internally. Circuit courts are now divided over the definition of a 
whistleblower. Recall that section 21F(a)(6) of the Exchange Act 
defines “whistleblower” as “any individual who 
provides	.	.	.	information relating to a violation of the securities laws 
to the Commission.”221 And these whistleblowers are protected, under 
section 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii), against retaliation by their employers.222 
According to the SEC’s interpretation of its final rule implementing 
the whistleblower program, however, this retaliation protection also 
extends to those who report internally, not only to the Commission.223 
Not surprisingly, however, courts differ over that interpretation. 
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,224 the Fifth Circuit held that, 
because the term “whistleblower” is defined by the statute, 
whistleblower protections extend only to those who externally report 
to the SEC.225 Later, the Second Circuit deferred to the SEC’s 
interpretation of the term whistleblower in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy 
LLC,226 holding that the Dodd-Frank Act also protects internal 
whistleblowers.227 One implication of this circuit split, so long as it 
remains, is that employees may be marginally more incentivized to 
report externally first—ensuring that they are protected from 
retaliation, especially outside of the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction. 
In addition, the SEC has also made clear that corporations lack 
any real means consistent with the Exchange Act of discouraging 
external reporting. As briefly mentioned earlier, in April 2015, the 
SEC announced that it had fined a global engineering and 
construction firm, KBR, $130,000 for attempting to stifle 
 
 220. Id. §	240.21F-6(b)(3). 
 221. 15 U.S.C. §	78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 222. Id. §	78u-6(h)(1). 
 223. 17 C.F.R. §§	240.21F-2(a)(2), 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii); see also Nicholas S. Goldin, 
SEC Interpretation of “Whistleblower” Definition, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/04/sec-
interpretation-of-whistleblower-definition/ [http://perma.cc/6E8X-XQ2H]. 
 224. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 225. Id. at 629–30. 
 226. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 227. Id. at 155. 
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whistleblowing through restrictive contractual language.228 In the 
course of internal investigations into illegal or unethical conduct, 
KBR would require employees to sign a confidentiality statement that 
prohibited employees from disclosing any information learned in the 
course of the investigation; breaches could result in disciplinary action 
or termination.229 KBR was required to amend the contract to include 
an exception for communications to federal government agencies.230 
The KBR suit, according to one prominent whistleblower attorney, 
was a “warning shot” to U.S. corporations and indicative of more 
such actions to come.231 
Finally, in 2014 and 2015, the Commission appeared increasingly 
open to awarding compliance officers for their information about 
internal misconduct. Though aware of the conflicts this might create, 
the Commission suggested in its cost-benefit analysis that the costs 
associated with allowing awards to compliance employees could be 
mitigated by the requirement for “independent knowledge”; that is, 
information that was not acquired in the course of one’s compliance 
or audit duties.232 Yet the final rule contains several exceptions that 
may swallow the rule.233 In August 2014, the Commission announced 
a $300,000 award to a whistleblower with an audit and compliance 
function, invoking an exception for cases in which misconduct had 
been reported internally, but the firm took no action within 120 
days.234 Later, in April 2015, the Commission announced an award of 
between $1.4 and $1.6 million to another compliance employee,235 
invoking yet another exception for compliance whistleblowers who 
have “a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the information 
to the Commission is necessary to prevent the relevant entity from 
engaging in conduct that is likely to cause substantial injury to the 
 
 228. KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, 2015 WL 1481158 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 229. Id. ¶¶	5–8. 
 230. Id. ¶¶	8–10. 
 231. Scott Higham, SEC Finds that KBR Confidentiality Agreements ‘Stifled’ 
Whistleblowers, WASH. POST. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations
/sec-finds-that-kbr-confidentiality-agreements-stifled-whistleblowers/2015/04/01/c78f6708-
d884-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html [http://perma.cc/F59K-AE4K]. 
 232. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-4(b)(1)–(2) (2015); Proposed Whistleblower Rule, supra note 
87, at 70,491–94. 
 233. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-4(b)(4)(v). 
 234. SEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to Audit and Compliance 
Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, SEC (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542799812 [http://perma.cc/48K6-EZVQ]; 
see 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-4(b)(v)(C). 
 235. SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer, 
supra note 146. 
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financial interest or property of the entity or investors.”236 As some 
commentators have noted, as the “whistleblower program matures, it 
is clear that the SEC is willing to use the available exceptions to 
reward company compliance personnel.”237 The concern with this 
trend is that compliance officers—those who should, more than 
anyone else, deal with misconduct internally—may now have 
incentive to abrogate this duty and go straight to the SEC. 
There is significant cost to financial institutions when they are 
unable to manage misconduct with self-initiated investigation and 
internal assessment or audits, before regulatory involvement. For one, 
rules that encourage external reporting instead of internal reporting 
can reduce the efficacy of corporate compliance efforts. As one 
commentator noted: 
Corporate compliance programs depend on a robust flow of 
information in order to be effective. Indeed, information is the 
lifeblood of such programs. Diverting a large portion of that 
flow of information to the government will impair companies’ 
ability to step in and interrupt violations at an early stage. This 
does not benefit investors, and it is at odds with the purposes of 
the securities laws.238 
Moreover, and relatedly, programs that subvert internal 
reporting may also reduce the energy and strategy that financial 
institutions are willing to invest in compliance. As two industry 
lawyers have noted, “[C]ompanies that have made the commitment 
and incurred the expense necessary for a robust internal audit and 
compliance effort will be left to wonder if doing so is truly in their 
interest.”239 Overall, if compliance seems futile, whistleblower 
programs might discourage firms’ efforts to build strong programs, 
and “companies that have chosen not to make that commitment will 
not only have secured a competitive advantage, they may find 
themselves [a] new model.”240 
 
 236. 17 C.F.R. §	240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(A). 
 237. Martin Weinstein, Robert Meyer & Jeffrey Clark, Company Compliance Officer 
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2.  Regulatory Resources 
A second potential cost of a whistleblower program, particularly 
a cash-incentivized one, is that it can encourage frivolous reporting 
and thus overwhelm investigative resources.241 One scholar noted at 
the program’s outset that the SEC “already receives more tips than it 
can reasonably handle.”242 
Though one can only speculate, the data on the SEC 
whistleblower program suggest this may be an issue. As 
Commissioner Casey initially expressed, “[a]ny triage process [to 
manage incoming tips and complaints] will be challenging, and a high-
volume flow of information will strain our existing triage resources. 
The staff has assured me that they’ll be able to handle the incoming 
flow of complaints, but I fear they are not being adequately 
circumspect.”243 Several years in, the data may confirm this concern. 
At the close of fiscal year 2015, the Commission has received over 
14,000 tips since the program’s inception but has only made twenty-
two awards.244 
These numbers may suggest that the SEC program incentivizes 
frivolous tips.245 The Commission has reported several extreme cases. 
For example, in May 2014, it issued a final order denying claims in 
connection with 143 cases; and it had previously denied fifty-three 
other claims from the same person.246 Another whistleblower, who 
had made twenty-five separate claims, was also denied for “knowingly 
and willfully ma[king] false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and 
representations to the Commission over the course of several 
years.”247 
The cost of inundating regulators with baseless information is 
that it further strains the already limited investigative resources of the 
 
 241. See Garrett, supra note 217, at 782–83 (noting that Dodd-Frank “created 
incentives for reporting without requiring the whistleblower to have some ‘skin in the 
game’	” and “creates an environment where the whistleblower can easily provide a tip to 
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whistleblower only has to fill out a 6-page document to submit their tip” (quoting 
Ebersole, supra note 17, at 162–63)). 
 242. Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 412 (2010); see also Rose, supra note 17, at 1238, 
1276 (discussing “nonmeritorious tips”). 
 243. Casey Statement, supra note 85. 
 244. 2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 1, 16, 21. 
 245. Alternatively, these data may also suggest that enforcement agencies simply lack 
the resources to pursue all of the high-quality information that whistleblowers provide. 
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SEC.248 The need not only to triage, but also to carefully evaluate on a 
prima facie basis the likely integrity of the information, may be 
wasteful of regulatory resources, which could be put to better use 
investigating higher quality information or enforcing more serious 
cases. 
3.  Antisocial Norms 
A third potential cost of whistleblowing programs is a social one. 
In some quarters, enlisting private citizens to aid the government’s 
enforcement initiatives raises concerns of a surveillance society, 
disloyal behavior, or confidentiality breaches.249 In some European 
and Asian countries, for instance, whistleblowing has these negative 
connotations. In Russia, for example, the word for whistleblower—
“donos” or “donoschik”—translates to “informant” and colloquially 
means something similar to “snitch.”250 For some Russians, it even 
connotes a relationship to the country’s history of repression during 
Stalinist rule.251 Likewise, in Germany, some scholars have suggested 
that whistleblower incentives might be associated with Gestapo-type 
reliance on denunciations.252 And in China, efforts to establish 
anonymous whistleblower hotlines may conjure memories of the 
Cultural Revolution, where “children were encouraged to inform on 
their parents, neighbors on their neighbors, and students on their 
teachers.”253 
Some also believe that whistleblower programs can impose social 
costs within an organization by eroding corporate loyalty. A 
prominent 1975 article in the Harvard Business Review quoted the 
then-chairman of the board of General Motors for the view that 
programs to encourage whistleblowers were “enemies of business” 
that “create suspicion and disharmony and pry into the proprietary 
interests of the business.”254 Professor Schmidt has noted more 
 
 248. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 249. See generally ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE 
CORRUPTION OF JUSTICE (2007) (describing the various ways in which “snitching” is 
viewed across segments of American society); MARK WORTH, WHISTLEBLOWING IN 
EUROPE 15–16, 71–72 (2013) (discussing common negative perceptions and reactions 
towards whistleblowers in a number of European countries). 
 250. Jasmine Martirossian, Russia and Her Ghosts of the Past, in THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 81, 91 (Roberta Ann Johnson ed., 
2004). 
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 252. See WORTH, supra note 249, at 47–48. 
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recently, “management as well as other employees tend to regard 
whistle blowers as disloyal.”255 The tension between loyalty and 
confidentiality on the one hand, and whistleblowing on the other, has 
already begun to arise in connection with the Dodd-Frank program as 
well. In particular, some firms have sued employees (or former 
employees) for common law breaches of contract or fiduciary duty 
(or under various federal laws) in response to employees that engage 
in self-discovery to shore up a whistleblower claim.256 
Finally, some detractors have argued that whistleblower 
programs backed by cash bounties are “morally corrupting because 
they ‘monetize virtue.’	”257 As Professor Rapp points out, the social 
cost is similar to that which arises in connection with a duty to rescue 
in tort law, “on the grounds that a financial obligation to rescue would 
cheapen the moral value of heroic service.”258 
The social costs of whistleblowing are admittedly quite difficult 
to predict and even more challenging to quantify. In the United States 
at least, Congress decided (even if implicitly) that the possible costs of 
antisocial behavior that a whistleblowing program might encourage 
are outweighed by the social costs of undetected and frequent 
financial misconduct. Nonetheless, as the financial markets continue 
to globalize, whistleblower programs are likely to become an issue of 
increasing transnational regulatory concern and on the agenda of 
international financial regulation. Accordingly, U.S. regulators should 
be careful to bear these social costs in mind when debating whether 
and how far to expand whistleblower initiatives.259 
 
 255. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards 
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4.  Unilateral Extraterritorialism 
Since the crisis, several major financial economies have either 
adopted or somehow reinvigorated financial whistleblower laws.260 
Yet in practice, whistleblower programs in Europe are far afield from 
the SEC whistleblower model.261 Many foreign jurisdictions remain 
resistant to strongly cash-motivated (and broadly defined) 
whistleblower laws.262 
Indeed, the whistleblower apparatus in several major financial 
economies in Europe differs notably from the Commission’s program. 
Take Germany, for example. Germany is a financial powerhouse of 
the European Union and home to the “global systemically important 
bank” (“G-SIB”) Deutsche Bank.263 Yet would-be whistleblowers in 
Germany face a challenging environment, with possible professional 
consequences attached to blowing the whistle, and a court system that 
appears to place a premium on employees’ loyalty to their 
employers.264 Outside the health and security contexts, Germany lacks 
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specific legislation that regulates or protects whistleblowing.265 
Whistleblowers are expected—with some exception—to disclose 
issues internally first,266 and there are no cash incentives for providing 
information.267 
France is similar.268 Also home to several G-SIBs, like BNP 
Paribas and Crédit Agricole Group, France historically has been 
resistant to whistleblower laws.269 French law, though it does permit 
reporting in finance and banking, does not actively incentivize the 
provision of insider information about financial misconduct.270  
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Switzerland, which hosts several G-SIBs, like UBS and Credit 
Suisse, may be “rocky terrain for whistleblowers.”271 As one scholar 
described it, 
any semblance of whistle blowing [in Switzerland] is couched in 
very broad and vague corporate governance rules whose overall 
import is a requirement that the board of directors takes 
appropriate measures to ensure the organisation’s compliance 
with the law, without specifically calling for a	.	.	.	whistle blower 
protection scheme.272 
In fact, disclosing banking information—considered to be business 
secrets—to a government authority (domestic or foreign) could 
actually trigger criminal liability.273 Though not intended to be a 
comprehensive (or close to comprehensive) survey of European law 
on whistleblowers, this overview illustrates that in several of the 
European jurisdictions with substantial financial activity, 
whistleblowers are not affirmatively incentivized and sometimes are 
even exposed to negative workplace, social, or legal consequences.274 
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One can thus readily see considerable divergence between the 
Commission’s whistleblower model—which proactively encourages 
whistleblower information—and that of its European counterparts. 
While there may be theoretical agreement between the United States 
and some European regulators that whistleblowing is desirable and 
effective,275 genuine convergence or coordination does not yet exist.276  
In the absence of a more unified approach to whistleblower 
information, the Commission has effectively taken a unilateral and 
extraterritorial approach.277 Interested in receiving information from 
the private markets abroad, the SEC has been clear that it will extend 
its cash bounty to foreign citizens as well.278 The extraterritorialism 
that this regulatory divergence has spurred also has costs.279 
 
 275. TIM MARSHALL & MICHAEL J. SHEEHAN, DLA PIPER, WHISTLEBLOWING: AN 
EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL COMPLIANCE 3 (1st ed. 2013), http://www.dlapiperuknow
.com/export/sites/uknow/products/files/uknow/DLA-Piper-Whistleblowing-
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GM6T-SFPG]; see WHISTLEBLOWING HANDBOOK, supra 
note 109, at 350. 
 276. In China, the trend is the same. Although China has a whistleblower program on 
the books, that law has been criticized by some as vague, overly limited, and potentially 
hortatory due to the lack of institutional commitment to it. See MARSHALL & SHEEHAN, 
supra note 265, at 17–18; see also Rachel Beller, Note, Whistleblower Protection 
Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve 
Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection 
Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 873–74, 894–98 (2011) (noting 
such criticism while arguing that the Chinese whistleblower program will ultimately be a 
success). 
 277. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, William B. McGuire Professor of the Practice of 
Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Extraterritorial Impacts of Recent Financial Regulation 
Reforms: A Complex World of Global Finance 10–11 (June 28, 2014), http://scholarship.law
.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6044&context=faculty_scholarship [http://perma.cc
/N28Q-S4HY] (discussing examples of extraterritoriality in the Volker Rule and 
derivatives reform). 
 278. From 2011 through September 2014, 1136 foreign nationals filed whistleblower 
disclosures to the SEC regarding reports on securities violations and foreign bribery. 
STEPHEN M. KOHN, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., THE IMPORTANCE OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER REWARDS IN COMBATING INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 5 (Dec. 9, 
2014), http://whistleblowers.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/whistleblowers/docs/BlogDocs/anti-
corruption-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VFS-LDL6]. In fiscal year 2014, the Commission 
authorized a $30 million whistleblower award that was “the fourth award to a 
whistleblower living in a foreign country.” SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 10 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/about
/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/VTX8-7Q43]. The Commission 
received 448 tips from abroad in 2014. Id. at 29. In fiscal year 2015, three awards were paid 
to people outside of the United States, and the Commission received 421 tips from abroad. 
2015 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 96, at 12, 30.  
 279. See Baxter, supra note 277, at 13–14 (listing a number of predicted challenges and 
noting that “our efforts to develop common minimum standards are	.	.	.	likely to move 
slowly forward, but at a very unpredictable pace and with numerous setbacks”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 861 (2016) 
2016] WHISTLEBLOWERS & INNOVATION 915 
One cost associated with unilateral extraterritorialism is that the 
Commission’s program may simply be less effective.280 Regulators in 
one jurisdiction, like the United States, may be unable to obtain 
information about the activities of private economic actors in another. 
Consider a hypothetical based on the manipulation of LIBOR, in 
which several global banks colluded for years to manipulate that 
benchmark.281 Both the United States and United Kingdom would 
have had an interest in the other regulator’s ability to detect the rate 
manipulation much sooner. That is, inasmuch as the SEC would have 
liked a private citizen to inform it of the misconduct, it would 
arguably have been equally invested in regulatory programs that 
afforded the opportunity and motivation for a U.K. citizen to make 
that same information known to U.K. financial regulators—and vice 
versa. But where the Commission’s program conflicts with another 
jurisdiction’s rules for whistleblowers, foreign citizens with useful 
information might be dissuaded (through law or simple fear of 
reprisals) from providing it to the U.S. government. 
A second cost of the divergence between U.S. and European 
models is the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. In the absence of 
coordination among regulators in these key financial economies, 
financial institutions may avert regulation entirely by shifting their 
activities to unregulated jurisdictions.282 To illustrate this problem, 
consider a second hypothetical. If the United States and all European 
Union states were to implement whistleblower programs—but 
Switzerland held out—Switzerland would become what Professor 
John Coffee calls a “financial casino.”283 Financial institutions that 
view whistleblowing as costly or burdensome could move some or all 
of their operations to Switzerland to avoid it.284 But precisely because 
Switzerland decides not to adopt a whistleblower program, all states 
are deprived of Swiss citizens’ inside knowledge about possible 
misconduct in Swiss financial institutions. As a hold out, Switzerland 
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thus obstructs the international financial community’s interest in early 
detection of misconduct that, although perpetrated on Swiss territory, 
has the potential to harm markets and institutions worldwide. 
Finally, a unilateral, extraterritorial approach may have 
significant legal, political, and logistical costs for the United States. 
Politically speaking, as a matter of international comity, 
extraterritorial regulatory extensions are generally disfavored.285 In 
the area of financial law especially, several European nations have 
been vocal in their opposition to U.S. efforts to project its rules and 
regulations abroad.286 Legally, the United States Supreme Court also 
has a dim view of extraterritorial financial regulation, as reflected in 
its 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.287 There, the 
Court held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act—“the basic 
antifraud provision of the U.S. securities laws”288—does not apply 
extraterritorially.289 Lower courts have applied that decision broadly 
to a wide range of statutes that confer a private right of action for 
securities law violations,290 and also the antiretaliation provision of 
the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program.291 
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assumed that its preferred financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the 
world”). 
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Cir. 2014) (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267). 
 289. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265. 
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Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167 (2012) (criticizing the holding 
in Société Générale as overreading Morrison). 
 291. Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens, AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014); Ulrich v. Moody’s 
Corp., No. 13-CV-00008 VSB, 2014 WL 4977562, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014); see also 
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Even if these legal and political cost-generating constraints could 
be minimized, it would still be unclear whether a unilateral system of 
whistleblowing—projected globally by the SEC—is sustainable or 
productive. Imagine a world in which the United States aims to 
induce information from French and German citizens, which states do 
not have robust financial whistleblower programs of their own. 
Though speculative, it seems fair to assume that these foreign citizens 
will probably be less likely to come forward to U.S. regulatory 
authorities, discouraged by their unfamiliarity with U.S. law and the 
simple annoyance of making the effort. Further, even if a foreign 
national were so inclined, the right incentives may not exist. U.S. 
regulators can only reward whistleblowers who provide information 
about violations of U.S. law or that which pertains to U.S. 
institutions.292 This necessarily means that U.S. regulators could not, 
for instance, induce insider information about an ongoing financial 
abuse in a major foreign banking institution if that misconduct did not 
directly violate U.S. securities law, even if all eight of the U.S. G-SIBs 
were counterparties to transactions with that institution. 
*	*	* 
As this Part has argued, there are many benefits to a strong, 
broadly scoped financial whistleblowing program. In the first 
instance, such a whistleblower program helps regulators overcome 
traditional asymmetries in information, expertise, and resources by 
leveraging private market actors—particularly in new frontiers of 
financial innovation. There are secondary benefits as well, including 
efficiency gains, more robust market discipline, and potential 
improvement in business conduct. At the same time, whistleblower 
programs have real costs—both economic and social. In an effort to 
maximize whistleblowing’s benefits, the next Part considers how 
certain design improvements might be effective in mitigating 
whistleblower programs’ costs. It also briefly considers some 
previously made proposals for redesign and suggests why they may be 
misguided. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN, DISCRETION, AND COORDINATION 
Until this point, this Article has highlighted the challenges to 
securities law enforcement where financial innovation and its 
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byproduct, diffusion, are concerned. It has suggested that, against 
these regulatory challenges, whistleblower programs can be an 
effective tool. And indeed, whistleblower programs have expanded as 
the darling of postcrisis securities law enforcement. Even so, many 
still debate the programs’ merits. To further that debate, the principal 
aim of Part II was to probe this postcrisis regulatory intervention with 
a revised and retrospective cost-benefit analysis. 
This Part evaluates existing, and offers some original, proposals 
for whistleblower program design. Section III.A considers additional 
requirements that could mitigate some of the costs discussed earlier. 
Section III.B evaluates—with some skepticism—suggestions to move 
away from a cash incentive scheme as well as the incentives suggested 
to replace it. Lastly, Section III.C suggests a path toward greater 
transnational coordination around whistleblowing programs. 
A. Reporting Requirements 
The benefits of whistleblower programs, as earlier discussed, are 
significant: not only are whistleblowers effective at detecting 
misconduct, these programs can also offer gains in efficiency, industry 
ethic, and market discipline, and provide some participatory or 
expressive value. This Section argues that several costs of 
whistleblower programs—such as their ability to tax regulatory 
resources or interfere with firm compliance—can be managed 
through revisions in regulatory design. 
One straightforward way to mitigate the costs associated with 
high volumes of low-quality tips is to impose additional requirements 
regarding the use of counsel. In other words, the SEC could require 
counsel to act as “gatekeepers” of the whistleblower program.293 The 
SEC has, after all, “long sought to enlist professionals as the advance 
guard of its Enforcement Division.”294 John Coffee has suggested, for 
example, that the SEC impose a certification duty on securities 
counsel with respect to corporate disclosures; in particular, Coffee 
suggests the SEC “mandate that all disclosure documents filed with it 
 
 293. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC 8 
(Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 221, 2003), http://www.law.columbia.edu/center
_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_listing?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=
69110&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DWP207.pdf	[http://perma.cc/8T7E-D4N3] (writing 
that “[t]he term ‘gatekeeper’ has been frequently used to describe independent professionals 
who serve investors, preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive”). 
 294. Thomas O. Gorman, The SEC, Gatekeepers and Saying Something, LEXISNEXIS 
LEGAL NEWSROOM (Sept. 10, 2015, 8:31 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom
/securities/b/securities/archive/2015/09/10/the-sec-gatekeepers-and-saying-something.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/T6PB-ZHN3]. 
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must be signed by an independent attorney, who would acknowledge 
his or her responsibility for the preparation or review of the 
document.”295 
Here too, with respect to the whistleblower program, the SEC 
could require whistleblowers to submit tips through counsel. (Counsel 
would presumably, in most cases, work on a contingency basis, taking 
a portion of the eventual award.) Counsel would be required to 
certify, prior to submission, the legitimacy of the tip after engaging in 
independent due diligence of the whistleblower’s information.296 
Requiring counsel to play a gatekeeping role could reduce the 
incidence of low-quality information and, as an added benefit, 
streamline the SEC’s task even further by presenting the Commission 
with a well-organized and coherent package. 
A second design improvement—to reduce compliance-frictional 
costs—would be requiring insiders to report misconduct internally 
before turning to the SEC. Although the whistleblower rule currently 
has no such requirement,297 the SEC considered one in the proposed 
rule, and various stakeholders in the industry strongly supported it.298 
The likely outcome of a reporting requirement would be a far more 
productive attitude in the industry toward the whistleblower program. 
It would also be closer in line with the model chosen by our economic 
partners abroad. Finally, by devoting resources to strengthening the 
industry’s internal whistleblower programs, regulators might play 
some role in reducing the industry stigma surrounding whistleblowers 
and altering industry norms and perceptions of financial 
misconduct.299 
B. Alternative Incentives 
Another common design question is whether bounties are an 
appropriate and productive incentive. As detractors point out, 
incentivizing whistleblowers with cash bounties has costs. For one, the 
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prospect of a large cash bounty may incentivize frivolous tips.300 There 
may also be public policy or social costs that arise from a pay-for-
information scheme.301 The United Kingdom, for example, has 
resisted a bounty model for fear that cash rewards would encourage 
antisocial behavior, such as malicious reporting and entrapment, and 
would have a negative impact on public perception.302 To mitigate the 
drawbacks of a purely cash-incentivized scheme, one possible design 
modification would thus be a statutory amendment to section 21F, 
which gives the SEC more discretion with respect to the kind of 
incentives it provides.303 
Several proposals along these lines have previously been made. 
One possibility is to wholly eliminate or substantially reduce cash 
incentives. There is some research to suggest that whistleblowers, at 
least generally speaking, are not solely motivated by bounties and 
that morality and civic duty play a significant role.304 In the financial 
services industry, however, motivating whistleblowers on morality 
grounds may be more difficult than in other industries. The problem, 
as others have suggested, is that financial misconduct is not always 
viewed as a morally reprehensible act. Professor Rapp argued, 
[I]n the context of financial fraud the moral need to blow the 
whistle is less salient than in other settings, where the decision 
to remain silent could compromise health and safety of 
employees or customers. Indeed, there is considerable moral 
ambiguity surrounding corporate fraud—with white collar 
crime not widely perceived as serious moral problem.305 
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Thus the question remains: in the financial services sector, are 
ethics a realistic alternative to cash incentives and would financial 
insiders’ moral duty alone yield high volumes of quality information? 
Some, like former Attorney General Eric Holder, fear that for a 
financial insider whistleblowing may not be worth the risks to one’s 
career, reputation, and social status, without substantial cash 
rewards.306 It may be, then, that in this context ethical incentives are a 
much-needed supplement to—but an incomplete replacement for—
cash rewards. 
Perhaps regulators need to find ways to augment the moral 
dimension to whistleblowing in finance, with the aim to complement 
and strengthen the existing incentive effects of cash bounties. They 
could, for example, focus on the development and design of business 
school training on whistleblower programs. Regulators could work 
with business school faculty and administration to develop modules or 
case studies on whistleblower cases, so that financial professionals 
develop a sense of whistleblowing as a professional and ethical duty, 
rather than as a stigmatized activity.307 
Also, by further educating investors, regulators could increase 
market pressure for whistleblowing, which might prompt the industry 
to develop a sense of ethical professionalism around whistleblowing. 
Just as financial firms have, in the past several years, taken their 
responsibility to the community and global society more seriously 
through movements for corporate social responsibility,308 so too might 
firms be encouraged to adopt more socially responsible compliance 
programs that educate and encourage their employees about 
whistleblowing. 
Commentators have also proposed that offering whistleblowers 
standing to bring claims in federal court would be a meaningful 
incentive. For example, several scholars have proposed that the 
 
 306. See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of 
Law, DOJ (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-
remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law [http://perma.cc/R9PH-
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statute be amended or augmented to include a qui tam–like 
provision.309 These proponents of a qui tam model argue that giving 
whistleblowers standing to bring suit would be compelling, by offering 
whistleblowers “public vindication” and the “chance to tell their 
stories and	.	.	.	restore their reputations.”310 And, in their view, it 
would remove the disincentive that the inability to bring a claim 
creates, by assuring whistleblowers that they would not have to 
“fight” to get their “fair share” of the award.311 Again, however, as 
with morality alone, it is unclear whether financial whistleblowers 
would be sufficiently motivated by a qui tam provision over the long 
term. Some would, to be sure, but the bulk of financial insiders more 
likely prefer to blow the whistle anonymously to avoid the 
professional and social consequences of doing so. 
In sum, while cash bounties may give rise to some costs, the cost 
of eliminating (or even reducing) them may be greater. In view of the 
unique circumstances and characteristics of employment in the 
financial services industry today, dispensing with cash incentives 
altogether may append the program’s fledgling success. U.S. 
regulators should, however, be mindful of and open to revisiting the 
bounty-driven nature of the program. Supplementary incentives could 
ultimately result in a more socially optimal design and appeal to a 
broader range of potential whistleblowers. 
C. Transnational Coordination 
As earlier discussed, the Commission’s unilateral, extraterritorial 
approach has also given rise to additional costs and possibly made the 
program less effective than it otherwise could be. This Section thus 
argues that international coordination is more desirable (and less 
costly) than extraterritorialism. It also suggests a way to accomplish 
such coordination through international financial regulatory 
networking institutions. 
The United States’ penchant for unilateral extraterritorialism 
could likely be significantly reduced if the existing international 
networking institutions were better able to broker coordination 
among the relevant states. As John Coffee points out, the 
extraterritorial provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act were in large part 
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motivated by Congress’s concern that “meaningful reform on the 
international level faced interminable delays before a sufficient 
international consensus could be reached.”312 A more efficient and 
effective international regulatory framework might thus satisfy 
national regulators who are eager to plug the gaps in securities law as 
applied to global institutions, counteracting these states’ desire to 
regulate and enforce with an extraterritorial reach.313 
This effort could perhaps most productively begin with work at 
the International Organization of Securities Organizations 
(“IOSCO”). IOSCO is an international standard-setter in the 
securities area.314 It is comprised of national securities regulators that 
regulate over ninety-five percent of securities markets worldwide.315 
The impetus for the development of this organization was, as Chris 
Brummer describes it, “the rapid internationalization of securities 
markets” and the reality that “financial globalization enabled greater 
mobility of fraudsters.”316 For that reason, “authorities wanted to 
ensure both robust (and common) approaches to securities regulation 
and sufficient cooperation to enforce national rules when criminals, 
evidence, and witnesses were in other countries.”317 This past year 
alone, IOSCO focused on converging regulatory policy regarding 
transparency in the credit default swaps market,318 researching the 
timeliness and frequency of disclosure to investors,319 and 
standardizing a code of conduct for credit rating agencies.320 
IOSCO also focuses on issues of financial misconduct in the 
global securities markets. In June 2015, it published a report on 
credible deterrence, identifying “key enforcement factors that may 
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deter misconduct in international securities and investment 
markets.”321 This report did address whistleblowers, though in a 
rather perfunctory fashion. It noted that “[w]histleblowers are a 
useful source of information and intelligence” and that “[r]eporting 
can be enhanced when jurisdictions provide legal protection to 
whistleblowers to prevent them from being adversely impacted or 
prejudiced as a result of providing information.”322 The report did not 
take a position on whether strong whistleblower programs—those 
with cash incentives—are more effective and efficient than more 
passive programs. Rather, it merely presented the two models—the 
U.S. and European—side by side.323 
There are likely political economy reasons for the lack of clear 
recommendation surrounding a strong whistleblower solution. Even 
so, IOSCO arguably could play more of a leadership role by 
undertaking a concrete analysis of the costs and benefits of both 
models and then setting a standard—or best practices—for 
whistleblower programs to which its member-state regulators would 
be expected to adhere. Beyond setting a standard for whistleblower 
programs, IOSCO could also provide standards for international 
coordination of national whistleblower programs through a 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (“MMoU”). A 
whistleblower MMoU could, for example, provide a procedure for 
enabling citizens of various jurisdictions to share inside information 
with regulatory authorities both domestically and abroad—even if it 
did not settle the transatlantic debate over cash incentives.324 
The FSB is another international financial regulatory institution 
that acts as an “agenda setter.”325 The FSB—formerly the Financial 
Stability Forum—was given a heightened mandate after the crisis. 
Today, the FSB plays a significant role in influencing the domestic 
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regulatory agendas of most major financial economies.326 In general, 
the FSB is charged with promoting standards, engendering what it 
describes as a “race to the top” worldwide in the implementation of 
best practices.327 A significant part of this mission is monitoring and 
evaluating adherence to international standards.328 
Thus, IOSCO and the FSB can be viewed as complementary 
institutions. Where IOSCO is principally focused on research, 
analysis, and the development of sector-specific standards, the FSB is 
focused on financial stability and international cooperation more 
broadly. In light of their respective institutional capacities, it would be 
important for the FSB and IOSCO to work together to set standards 
for and then coordinate a transnational whistleblower policy. As part 
of the FSB mandate, the FSB could thus complement the standard-
setting work of IOSCO by working with individual jurisdictions to 
transition to a more robust whistleblower paradigm and, 
subsequently, coordinating information sharing that such regimes 
might yield on the domestic level. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that regulators face new—and ever-
changing—challenges in contemporary financial markets, which are 
increasingly innovative, complex, and diffuse. Old models of 
securities law enforcement, which are primarily reactive, have quickly 
become outdated; proactively anticipating misconduct is key to the 
health of and confidence in the financial markets. Yet regulatory 
agility in innovative financial spaces can be difficult to achieve; 
regulatory gaps largely stand in the way. Inherently, regulators 
operate at a disadvantage in terms of information, resources, and 
expertise. They thus require assistance from the private market itself. 
Whistleblowers have proven a viable solution to these modern-
day challenges that financial innovation poses to regulation and 
enforcement. As a regulatory tool, whistleblowers complement state 
power by contributing the private market’s resources and knowledge 
to the task of curbing misconduct. Specifically, in weighing the 
benefits against the costs, this Article argues that whistleblower 
solutions are a desirable regulatory choice from the perspective of 
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stability, efficiency, public welfare, and business ethics. Moreover, this 
Article urges greater movement toward transnational cooperation or 
the convergence of whistleblowing programs. As innovation in the 
industry—along with the complexity and diffusion that it brings—will 
no doubt continue, internationally coordinated whistleblower 
programs are an ideal tool for addressing misconduct in global 
finance. Ultimately, then, this Article not only offers concrete ways to 
improve whistleblower program design domestically but also suggests 
a way to effectuate much-needed international coordination around 
the whistleblower solution through the framework of international 
financial regulation. 
